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“The King died and the Queen died’ is a story. 
“The King died and then the Queen died of grief” is a plot.  
--- E. M. Forster 
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I.   Introduction 
  Down from the time of Rig Vedas to Charles Metcalf’s characterization of 
villages as ‘republics’ to the now famous dictum of ‘power to the people’ by Lord 
Rippon (a hundred and twenty five years ago), followed by the Bengal initiative in 1885, 
or indeed the more recent Gram Swaraj concept of Mahatma Gandhi, Panchayat Raj has 
been the recurrent theme in our political discourse. In its most potent form the credit of 
ushering in the Panchayati Raj Institutions must go to the dynamism of the youthful 
Prime Minister the late Shri Rajiv Gandhi. In the modern rendition too the efforts have 
witnessed a long travail. Following Article 40 of the constitution, 1953 saw the first 
central initiative to establish local governments, this was followed by the 1963 
recommendations on fiscal devolution and finally by 1986 the need to amend the 
constitution was recognized. Despite the faltering attempt of the 64
th Constitutional 
Amendment Rajiv Gandhi pressed on with the 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments, 
convinced that it encapsulated the vision and injunction by our founding fathers. He was 
acutely conscious that the fruition of the ambitious project of Panchayati Raj would take 
at least a generation. Normally a successful mission completion and getting on-line 
requires that it follows a sequence of process conceptualization, legal notifications, actual 
implementation followed by monitoring of processes and outcomes followed finally by 
evaluation and feedback for course correction and possible re-engineering. The problem 
with current situation vis-à-vis PRIs is not conceptual. Through much debate and 
discussion there seems to have emerged a consensual clarifying response in terms of 
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taking his constitutional walk at the Jogger’s Park. The usual disclaimer applies. organizational frame and processes that need to be followed. The peculiar federal set up 
that India is of course comes in the way of full and immediate implementation. After all 
is said and done, it boils down to effective implementation which necessarily has the pre-
requisite of empowerment of PRIs through effective devolution of finances. Herein – as 
they say – lies the rub. 
  The paper is divided into nine sections – with suitable subsections – including this 
one. In the next section, we provide the background and the context for this piece. In the 
third section we look briefly at the International scenario, in the fourth section we deal 
with the overall Indian situation, in the fifth section we look at the Maharashtra case for 
which some additional data is available. In the sixth section we consider some other 
states based on the material available from some specific studies. In the seventh section 
we look at the main stumbling blocks that exist in implementing the thought out 
processes. In the eighth section we suggest the way forward. In the final section we 
conclude.  
II.   Prologue: The Backdrop and the Context 
  The current Indian parametric environment, we believe is defined by three 
important points of departure that are relevant to our discussion. One is globalization that 
engulfs the Indian economy, polity and society. Two the Indian political space is 
characterized by a fractured polity. Three, there is a strong macroeconomic growth story 
that India enjoys. Within the conjuncture thus presented the problematique has inclusion 
at its very epicenter. For, to state the obvious, development without the crucial 
constituent of inclusion, is hardly development at all! 
  Whilst the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization as a strategy are well 
documented (see for example Oates 1972, Tiebout 1961, Tanzi 1996 and Prud’homme 
1995) such academic discussion need not detain us here as it is clearly not warranted. 
Whilst it is difficult to empirically establish the positive effects of decentralization and 
weigh them against the disadvantages of institutional capacities at the lower level, there 
are a multitude of individual examples of positive impact of decentralization on 
governance as well as human development measures. Good governance is recognized as 
the key to efficient and welfare enhancing key, of which decentralization is one of the 
constituent best practice. Indeed there is a fair consensus that decentralization whilst it is 
a challenging and complex process that requires dedicated participation by all its stake 
holders, it promises to be a mechanism for improved democratic governance and 
sustainable human development. In any case the process of decentralization has been 
institutionalized through constitutional amendment and is here to stay as is the fact of 
globalization and are best treated as fait accompli. Globalization has been accompanied 
by tremendous increase of prosperity and yet there continue to exist large islands of 
abject poverty. Even where the poverty has been dented the inequality has increased. 
These are clearly warning signals for sustained human development. The IT enablement 
of businesses characteristic of globalization have reduced the relevance of the boundaries 
of nation states and also the policy making power of the State. In today’s global world 
order the mantra is to think global and act global. The complimentary synergistic relation 
between local and global institutions and operations is well recognized (Ministry of 
Panchayati Raj 2006). This is crucial for the effective adumbration of the ‘glocal’ 
paradigm. There is no better vehicle – in India – than a meaningfully empowered, extant 
framework provided by PRIs. Although India has a federal structure albeit not in the classical sense it is 
essentially a Union with a strong centripetal bias with the constitution ensuring an 
overwhelming and overriding power to the central government. The political scenario in 
recent times has been such that more and more ground has had to be yielded to the states. 
The days of single party domination are long past and coalitional politics are here to stay. 
The regional parties have been gaining ground for some time now. A more recent trend 
has been emergence of strong local leaders even within the National Parties. This is quite 
different from the case of Argentina where macro-stability and other issues were taken 
care of because, not only was the national government able to set up hard budget 
constraints but partly also because it had a strong party control of both legislators at the 
Central level as well as at the level of sub-national governments (see, Dillinger, W and S. 
Webb (1999). In the current context of PRIs getting effectively empowered, especially 
because many of the public goods have to be provided and serviced locally (below state 
level), the continued fractured mandate (as far party political strength is concerned) 
means that the situation is full of potential issues. More than ever before the ‘political 
feasibility’ in a fractured and heterogeneous domain of Indian polity will present a biting 
reality. However, we believe that such a situation could be turned on its head to 
bring more progress – rather than less – on the front of empowerment of PRIs. This 
belief is supported by a couple of rather hazy propositions about the link between 
political structure and decentralization. One, that the ceterus paribus, Central 
government is far more pro-decentralization (including financial devolution) that the 
State level government. The reason for this is simply the threat perception resulting out 
of the decentralization by the governments at the two levels. Since the disutility arising 
out of sharing resources (economic and political) with others is independent (it is a matter 
of indifference) whether the sharing takes place with one or more sub-national 
governments. Whereas for the State government it matters how much it actually devolves 
lower. Second the ‘distance’ and ‘level’ considerations also lead us to believe that 
decentralization threat is perceived to a much greater extent and immediacy at the State 
as compared to the Central level. Two, regional parties would – ceterus paribus – be 
more inclined to decentralization. More specifically, political parties which derive their 
strength from regional agenda (which are necessarily people-touching and 
participatory) and generally parties that are cadre based are more positive about 
decentralization. This is because the party structure continues to be prominent whether 
the party is in office or out of it, thus official/ elected positions do not grant sufficient 
powers to provide a threat to higher level functionaries (in office as well as the party). 
Finally, coalitional government at the central level – especially with one national and 
others essentially with regional identification – will augur well for an effective big push 
towards effective decentralization. These then, are the reasons for our seemingly 
sanguine hope and assertion. Let us turn to the crucial sub-theme of inclusion. 
II.1  Inclusion as a Soul of our Strategy 
It is important to understand that our insistence of inclusion as an embedded part 
of the strategy is not dictated by ethico-moral considerations (although these are not bad 
reasons either). It is a pragmatic position born out of considerations of feasibility and 
sustainability of the much needed growth phenomenon, within the Indian socio-political 
milieu. The great Indian growth story of the recent past is too well known to require too 
much elaboration. In recent times, the upswing in the secular rate of growth of the Indian economy to around 7+%, wherein it has managed to significantly break away from the 
‘Hindu rate’ (3.5%) has had positive impact on the way in which India is perceived the 
world over. This feat is especially noteworthy because it has been achieved by a country 
whose democracy has been often characterized as a functioning anarchy. The current 
growth experience and its impact on the macro-level fiscal and income variables – in 
terms of the positive growth dividend – must finally put to rest all the anti-growth 
rhetoric. It is amply clear (in the context of growth scenario) that all the good things – 
in social sphere, in terms of inclusion – can now be realistically afforded by the Indian 
policy maker, perhaps for the first time! It is indeed necessary that we do something 
here especially given that the ‘poor’ states have remained ‘poor’ through this growth 
episode, with the inescapable conclusion that there is certainly an exclusionary sub-plot 
to this growth story. 
This has two implications, one, for purposes of satisfying the very important tenet 
of inclusion, greater weight needs to be to be given to social sectors in a targeted and 
performance based manner. Two, it is crucial that the growth (even when somewhat 
exclusionary in character) has to be sustained, with the further implication that the design 
of  any policy strategy must have incentive compatibility meaningfully as its 
cornerstone. Having taken care that the growth rate regime is not jeopardized, the 
essential step will be to concentrate on the ‘inclusive’ aspect of growth. Growth is after 
all only an instrument that strategically will ensure that development takes place. 
Inclusive effects are intrinsic to the process of development – properly understood – and 
surely require focused attention. We believe that not only does this make good economic 
sense but happily makes good political sense too. We believe that in strategizing in this 
regard, the framework of PRIs will have to play a crucial and integral role. 
  Inclusion then is at the very heart of the matter. Much ingenuity will have to 
exercised and much will have to be drawn from the Indian experience is working out a 
strategy that will dovetail it with the forces at play (policy nduced as well as autonomous) 
within the Indian socio-political economic milieu. Inclusiveness may be said to have two 
dimensions, one in terms of sectors of economy and two in terms of groups/ persons who 
have been by passed by the growth process (Mujumdar, 2007). Apart from the PRIs that 
will have to be pressed into action, the other significant change has to be in terms of 
investment climate in order to up the magnitude seriously. After all, inclusive growth is a 
complicated phenomenon involving coordinated role of actors such as PRIs, State and 
Central Government, and NGOs (SHGs) amongst others on one hand and the vision of a 
new architecture of rural credit on the other. Supply led and (non-clinical) extension 
based innovation in credit delivery has to be learnt afresh by the banking community at 
large. The mistakes in the interest rate policy that led banks to hold SLR securities 
thereby crowding out priority sector lending (including agriculture), leading to 
disenfranchisement of rural borrowers, under the wrong characterization of it leading to 
NPAs,  must not be repeated. In the Indian context a macro view of credit risk needs to be 
developed that so that the dual role of growth enhancement and risk mitigation are 
fulfilled in the case of agriculture and allied activities (see again, Mujumdar 2007). 
Changing risk profile as well as risk perception of the bankers must be an explicit and 
sharply defined policy objective of credit policy, with the capability to translate potential 
demand into viable risk projects. We shall have an occasion to return to this theme later 
in this piece. What we are recommending – to be sure – is not a return to the old ways, but rather a move to a more enlightened – Mark II if you like – market theology. In the 
newer context this calls for a new/ redefined role of the State which simultaneously 
lets go and work more intensively on narrowly defined objectives. There are two 
important strands of argument to be made in this context, and at length, in the context of 
decentralization. One, it will be abundantly clear that one of the things we must do is to 
consolidate schemes that have grown and continue to grow exponentially with the 
absorption showing perennial decline (the last is also true of many schemes such as RIDF 
but also of the brilliantly put together PMGSY with the structure of oversight in place 
and technical inputs, including appropriate technology worked upon) . In doing so, 
priorities will need to be set so that the problem is tractable and manageable. We believe 
that the first such effort has to be concentrated on three areas, Water, Education and 
Roads. The road connectivity leads to remarkable impact on the lives of the rural folk, as 
has been amply documented. As Narayan et al have pointed out (See, India Infrastructure 
Report 2007), the prevailing conditions make it difficult for people to get their goods to 
the market or for people to get to their place of work or indeed to access health in 
emergency and generally to access public services. Education as a constituent of 
development needs no argument, but its delivery through various schemes (notably SSA) 
as now designed is unsatisfactory. As far as water is concerned it is the life line of 
civilizations, it is said that the next world war will be fought about water. It is important 
to combine all the schemes (funds there from) that look at the consumption 
(drinking/conservation/wells) as well as the investment (minor irrigation 
schemes/harvesting) aspects as play them through the instrumentality of PRIs. The water 
programs are not functioning properly (especially the ones with respect to irrigation). 
Indeed the technical committee on water shed development has opined that given the 
estimate of about 150000 crores and the actual devolution is woefully short, there is a 
good case for NREGS funds to be merged. It has been noted that such programs alone 
will be the saviors of agriculture in rain fed regions. Of course, in case of drought prone 
areas there would have to be a different approach.  There is evidence to show that the 
political empowerment of women have also thrown up such schemes as perceived 
priorities so that acceptability will not be an issue (for all assertions made above see, 
India Infrastructure Reports especially 2007 dealing with Rural Infrastructure, also see 
Annual Report of RDD, GoI 2007, Shubham Chaudhary, 2007 and N.A. Mujumdar 
2007)). The externality of such reorganization will be that that the utilization will 
improve and through impetus to the rural hubs initiative, livelihoods will be created, 
which alone is the surest way of empowerment. Here one needs to emphasize that there 
are two elements viz., Health and Power that we have left out that are generally 
recognized as terribly important. The reason is that whilst some elements (extension) can 
be incorporated, prioritization requires that things be kept at manageable levels and also 
that there are indications (from experience elsewhere) that given the skill demands of 
both these sectors and the prevailing situation these are not sector that lend themselves to 
easy and successful decentralization. The second strand of the argument here is that 
consolidation and transferring the funds to PRIs (along with functionaries) will lead to 
possibilities of financial market access. This can and should be encouraged using various 
possibilities and experiences (see Pethe and Lalvani, 2006). But we will leave this for the 
moment and return to this theme later in the piece.  Finally, in this context, two important points to kept in mind are that: one, that at 
the current stage in India, the importance of ‘Dhan Dhanya Vipula Bhavatu’ should not 
be underestimated and two, that the best way to ensure inclusion is through provision of 
livelihoods. We now turn to the International experience and derive some lessons. 
 
III.  Prologue: The International Scenario
ℜ
  A lot of documentation is available on international experience on 
decentralization, federalism and local governments. In this section we take a look at some 
of the experiences of the developing countries, the transition economies as well as the 
more developed ones. Clearly in terms of drawing lessons from these experiences, the 
order of listing of the country categories are in decreasing order of importance and 
relevance. In the main we depend on the excellent work by Work, R (2002), Anwar Shah 
(2005) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007). The following sections are based on the 
case studies as reported in the literature cited above, which at once represents large 
number as well as representative sample of countries. One of the chief tractable finding is 
that fiscal decentralization always seems to follow (rather slowly) after political 
decentralization in a uniform pattern and also that it is much less in magnitude (as judged 
by various available indices of decentralization). This is perhaps along the expected lines. 
Further for the lower income group of countries, this gap is strikingly large and uniformly 
reduces as one traverses upward through the higher income categories. Also, it is clear 
that western developed countries use decentralized framework (local level governments) 
as a cost effective mechanism whereas the others use it either as support to consolidate 
central power or as response to or as antidote to inefficiencies and ineffective government 
delivery of local public goods. We treat the experiences in the reverse order i.e., in 
increasing relevance. 
III.1 Developed  Countries 
  This section is heavily base on Robert Work (2002) and Tony Travers (2007). 
Importance of decentralization as a intrinsic part of good governance mechanism for 
delivering welfare enhancing activities especially with local public goods character has 
been universally recognized. Unlike UK, the regional and local governments within the 
other developed countries operate within a written constitution. Necessarily therefore the 
reform there (unlike in UK where it is unstructured and hence more feasible) is halting 
and conservative. The experience in terms of tax assignments amongst other things have 
been quite diverse and yet compatible with reasonable success in terms of performance. 
In the Nordic countries local income taxes form a sound and buoyant economic base. In 
the USA, individual states can take a pick from an array of taxes. Unlike the UK (with 
one prominent local tax), the French use a number of smaller taxes. It has been found that 
single tax causes more attention (for the same tax effort) and hence is more than mildly 
troublesome. Italy is perhaps the best example of the most extensive form of fiscal 
decentralization. Full equalization is the accepted norm in Australia and European 
countries where national identity of citizens imply that similar level of services need to be 
provided to all their citizens. Differential level of local public goods and services 
provision is acceptable in the USA hence precluding the need for equalization. Grants are 
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Thus, a wide variety of arrangements are to be seen at work each having emerged through 
respective historical experiences and specific needs. The important lesson to be derived is 
that the decentralization structure is varied and dependant on the historical-cultural 
milieu and does not lend to easy transplantation. The range of measure of the size of the 
local governments is seen to vary from 7.5% to 25% of the economy. Expectedly, the 
smaller the size the lesser will be the political concerns that will be raised. The revenues 
raised by the local governments are expected to fund roughly around half of the 
expenditures. Targeted or specific grants are seen where the welfare and equity concerns 
predominate. There is a perceived danger that this will lead to micro-management by 
higher levels or the equity aspects may somewhat suffer. In the Indian case (since it is 
still a low income developing country) we believe that this is a ‘danger’ we will need to 
face head on. Of course, this will necessarily (and advisedly) be in a non-uniform 
fashion, implying a redefinition /change of role of the State. Given the capacity levels 
some amount of hand holding and micromanagement will be inevitable with the hope that 
equity will not suffer. This hope will have to be pinned on a strong civil society and 
(surprisingly) fractured polity not to mention a positive bureaucracy. This is required 
especially because inter-state inequality has been sustained over tome and poorer states 
have remained so even through the growth phenomenon and the fact that Indian integrity 
requires that every citizen have access to similar level of public service. Thus, whereas 
there has been a toying with the idea of differential service levels as a beneficial concept 
in some of the western developed countries it is clearly not relevant to India at this stage 
of development and well-being. Finally, whereas, there seems to be divided opinion on 
whether the reform ought to be incremental or ‘big-bang’, there seems to be consensus on 
the crucial need for adequate finances at the local level. 
III.2  Developing and Transitory Economies (DTEs) 
  The movement here is inspired as a response to the collapse (actual or perceptual) 
or dramatic change in the order of centrist economies (either of the dictatorial regimes or 
the ones defined by the collective control). The rationalization is to be found in the 
famous decentralization theorem (see Oates 1972) that each public service is to be 
provided by the jurisdiction having control over a minimal geographical area that would 
internalize benefits and costs of such provision. This provides convenient manageable 
partitioning of the domain as well as theoretical foundation. There are also the 
corollaries, namely, the principle of subsidiarity and expenditure assignment must 
precede tax assignment. The corollaries are not followed in most cases except that the 
second one is by vacuous logic. 
  Looking at the paths that some of the financial variables/ratios display over two 
decades for the countries in this category, there are some interesting convergence patterns 
that are discernable. Using the decentralization measures developed by World Bank (see 
Anwar Shah, 2005), it is clear that there is some amount of expenditure autonomy as well 
as tax autonomy for both developing and transitory economies. As predicated by the 
second corollary above, the tax autonomy is less than the expenditure autonomy. In case 
of transitory economies the measures for both these are higher than the corresponding 
values for the developing countries. As far as the expenditure as a percent of GDP is 
concerned, for the developing countries it has risen from 3 to 6% whereas for transitory 
economies the figures come down from around 17 to 10%. For the expenditure as a percent of total government expenditure, for the developing countries it has risen from 13 
to 22% whereas for transitory economies the figures come down from around 45 to 24%. 
In case of the expenditure on education as a percent of expenditure at sub-national level, 
for the developing countries it has gone up from 12 to 45% whereas the comparable 
figures for transitory economies the figures come down marginally from around 31 to 
29%. For health, the expenditure as a percent of expenditure at sub-national level, for the 
developing countries has gone up from 7 to 12% whereas for transitory economies the 
figures come down from around 22 to 17%. Whilst these are merely observed statistical 
trends, it may be tempting to infer some kind of convergence points for each of the 
categories/ratios. 
  Some of the lessons to be drawn from these cases are interesting. Civil service 
reforms are critical for success. In developing countries, there appears to be a tendency to 
develop transfer dependency. Sub-national governments must be made to face financial 
consequences for their decisions (however, how does one penalize a sub-national 
government without harming the interests of the citizens is a design challenge!). Tax 
decentralization is pre-requisite to credit market access. Most importantly, that traditional 
administrative capacity matters but should not be an excuse for not decentralizing. For, 
institutional environment of developing countries – even more than the industrialized 
ones – calls for a greater degree of decentralization.  
III.3 Developing  Countries 
  This section is based on the comprehensive recent work by Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2007). In their expectedly brilliant work they focus on the lower strata of 
governments thereby distinguishing their work from that of Rodden, Eskeland and 
Litvack (2003) which focuses on the provincial or state level governments. The 
phenomenon of decentralization or reduction in centralist control (in the earlier 
communist regimes) occurred simultaneously in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern 
Europe. The earliest changes were to be seen in the 70s, the momentum picked up in the 
80s and accelerated in the 90s. Lack of accountability in economic terms corresponds to 
outcomes that reflect implicit policy weights that deviate substantially from the (locally 
perceived) welfare weights. One of the important things is that the reservation provision 
in decentralization design has impacted this in a positive manner. There are of course 
some preconditions that have to be met for success otherwise decentralization can lead to 
outcomes that are inferior to even the outcomes of the corrupt centralized regimes. 
  The cases considered discussed here span three continents and may be 
conveniently classified into three categories. The first are the cases where movement has 
been from centralized, dictatorial regimes to democracy, reflecting a paradigm shift aided 
by support and advised by Fund-Bank experts. The second category is of countries where 
the democracy at the national level was entrenched and it was sought to be extended at 
local levels. The third type comprises of countries that are characterized by the fact that 
they have off and on, hummed and hawed with the decentralization experiment.  
  In the first category one finds decentralization essentially as a response to crises 
(major and minor). One also finds the implementation that is gradual as well as of the big 
bang variety. Reduction of interregional inequalities is the positive impact to be seen and 
the practice of formula based devolution is the order of the day. The level of – at least the 
perception – public participation in the economic processes seems to have improved and 
the impact has been positive in terms of reduction of corruption. In the second category of countries, the impetus was to be found in the apparent lack of effectiveness of delivery 
by the government. There appears to be a counter balancing act amongst the troika of 
public, the political parties and the civil society. The process has been strengthened by 
the increase in devolution to the tune of 10 to 20%. Where there has been limited 
devolution and where the entrenched bureaucracy has not been fully on board, the 
process has been slow and drawn out. The exception has been where the ruling party 
directly proximate to the decentralized level has been a cadre based one and so has been 
interested in passing on the resources to the local governments to strengthen mass based 
support. In a variant of this theme, the case where guerillas (who were outsiders to the 
legit political actors) have been entrusted with the power, there by institutionalizing their 
roles within the purview of the overall main-stream politics and yet at once providing 
stability at the central level giving relief from the divisive/ security threats. One of the 
specific lessons here has been that it is difficult to bring about decentralization in the 
health sector. In the third category are countries that have had military dictatorships, 
central party-based command and control as well as a big ticket event (renunciation of 
apartheid regime). Here, you find a variety of reasons for decentralization effort. One is 
the strategy of divide and rule; fragment the polity at the lower level to secure relative 
peace at the top. The economic devolution has been of a lower and heterogeneous 
(temporally) order. The bureaucracy has been put under the elected representatives. The 
strategy has not been successful in delivering important public goods like health and 
education. The other reason is prompted by the change in paradigm of economic 
management, while keeping the power and structure in tact, devolving economically and 
administratively but not so much politically. This has been economically successful and 
also politically in that despite the party strangle-hold the public are more attuned to 
speaking up leading to greater administrative transparency. This however, represents a 
unique variant also in that here there is an upward flow rather than downward devolution 
of funds. In yet another case in this category, that of apartheid regime change, there is 
now more equitable resource distribution which is less arbitrary. There is yet an 
imbalance between the availability and need for funds but that is generic to the country at 
all levels.  
  Thus, the dominant motive for move towards decentralization has been the 
challenge to incumbent at the national level (perceived or real) from competing political/ 
regional forces. The lessons to be learnt from these experiences seem to be that big bang 
strategy with public participation performs better more often than not. Constellation and 
distribution of political power plays an important role. Transfer dependencies imply hard 
rather than soft budget constraints, which may be fine except that too large a gap between 
Economic and administrative and devolution are more important for better outcomes. 
However, given that generally (except where the party is very dominant and cadre based) 
financial devolution seems to follow political one this may not be greatly relevant. 
III.4  Lessons for India  
  Whilst the different experiences emanating from a host of experiences the world 
over while of general interest, they naturally differ in importance from the Indian 
standpoint. The array of arrangements of a myriad of different aspects leading to success 
stories as well as unsuccessful ones reminds one of the celebrated ‘Folk Theorem’ or 
generally the critique of economic theorizing, where presumably anything goes. However 
this feature is indeed at once both a strength and weakness. The responsibility of eliciting useful lessons and reading our situation and hence working through the correspondence 
principle to derive specific ‘learnings’ falls squarely on us. The raison de etre, 
decentralization in India is deeply rooted in our history and culture and reflected in the 
political pronouncements throughout our history. Let us list out a few of the pointers: 
•  It is obvious that one of things that must be done is that the size of the local 
government has to be increased uniformly. The local governments will only then 
come into their own and into reckoning. The size at the lowest tier in particular 
needs to be increased so that public participation is assured. 
•  At the current stage, some scope for hand holding and even micro-management 
may be called for. This could be achieved through the transfers – with gate 
keeping – by a constitutional authority such as the Central Finance Commission to 
minimize politicization.  
•  Big Bang approach should be pressed for, otherwise there will be time for the 
entrenched order to enter caveats and qualify the substantive proposals to render 
them ineffective. The current constellation of distribution of forces within the 
political space is such that, this seems possible as never before. 
•  Civil services reform is hugely important. It is essential that the some of the state/ 
scheme officials should be working under panchayats. In this context, it has been 
noted that the field office is often times treated as punishment transfer. The 
distance from the seat of power is seen as a hindrance to possible promotions. It is 
essential that it be made compulsory for all to work at field postings. However, 
not being votaries of ‘compulsion’ approach, we would rather like this to be 
achieved through incentive mechanism. Altogether there is the general (nebulous 
and hence difficult) task of enthusing the civil service agents with positive energy 
as far as agenda of the PRIs is concerned.  
•  Transfer dependencies have to be reduced as far as possible because they induce 
lack of accountability as well as lethargy. The move towards borrowing – which 
involves – change in the bank behavior at large is also important. This as 
indicated earlier will be a theme we will return to later. 
•  Traditional administrative capacity matters but should not be used as an excuse to 
not decentralize. Indeed for all the problems and challenges, countries like India 
require decentralization far more than even the industrialized economies. 
IV.  Core: The Indian Situation 
  Considerable work has been done in the different aspects of Panchayati Raj 
institutions in India. The work by Oommen (2005) and the work by Amba Agarwal, Goel 
and Rajneesh and of course those by Govinda Rao, Indira Rajaram as well as State of the 
Panchayati Raj (MoPR, 2006) are particularly noteworthy. The voluminous literature 
here is huge – even by the standards of the argumentative Indians – and discusses and 
debates every aspect of the functioning of PRIs. The upshot – as noted earlier – is that 
clearly the issues are not epistemological or conceptual by a long shot. They are more in 
the nature of ‘will’ as well as translating the concepts into real processes and actual 
implementation. It is prudent to enter a caveat here that ‘evaluation’ as is attempted here 
is necessarily circumscribed by the availability of uniform reliable and consistent data at 
the all India level, and as such is less than what we would have ideally liked especially 
given that this section is heavily data intensive. 
IV.1  Fiscal Performance of PRIs: An Inter-State Comparison In this section of the study we attempt an inter-state comparison of the fiscal 
performance of PRIs. Data on rural local bodies in the various states are available from 
the Central Finance Commissions (CFCs) both 11
th and 12
th and also from the State 
Finance Commissions. (SFCs). The SFC data are somewhat more detailed but since not 
all SFCs are available on public domain and there is the danger of differing 
methodologies being used for compiling of the data, it would be inappropriate to use 
them for inter-state comparison purposes as is being attempted here. For our purpose of 
state comparison the CFC data (although relatively aggregate) would be most suitable. 
However, even this data set needs to be used cautiously. Both Govinda Rao (2007) and 
Oommen (2005) have drawn attention to several examples to explain why they find the 
data set to be suspect. Assam has no capital expenditures in all five years and neither 
does it have any data on grants; Bihar has no numbers for own taxes, Karnataka receives 
no grants. The breakup of the data into revenue and capital expenditures seems even 
more problematic. Capital expenditures appear to be more than five times that of revenue 
expenditures for U.P. However, all data sets have their limitations – to that extent this 
data set is no exception. But given that the central finance Commissions (both 11
th and 
12
th) have actually provided separate funds for maintenance of data base one would have 
hoped to see a more authentic looking data set.   
Having sounded alarm bells regarding the data set, we proceed to use the existing 
data sets provided by the 11
th and 12
th FCs to make some inter-state comparisons. The 
paucity of data for some variables for some of the states necessitated that we curtail our 
analysis to fifteen major states. These include: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya P, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, U.P. W. Bengal. The changing pattern of some key variables in per capita terms 
over the period 1993-94 to 2002-03 were used as indicators to signal the fiscal 
performance of these states.  
 
Table 1: Key Indicators (15 states)  
(in Per Capita Terms)                              


















93-94  3.132  9.21  160.91 158.51 4466.66 4573.31  N.A. 
94-95  3.750  10.87  178.42 167.69 5190.48 4797.91  N.A. 
95-96  4.188  11.80  203.46 202.32 5550.55 4681.05  N.A. 
96-97  4.799  12.62  247.66 238.88 6390.17 4986.09  N.A. 
97-98  5.252  13.87  302.75 295.42 6724.35 4846.38  N.A. 
Average (93/94 to 
97/98)  4.224  11.673  218.641 212.565 5664.442 4776.948   
 1998-99    15.28  28.11  306.70 318.79 7459.26 4975.00 166.03 
 1999-00    15.86  31.62  382.41 373.07 7674.06 4881.51 212.70 
 2000-01    17.66  33.06  403.51 404.27 8438.17 4830.20 220.82 
 2001-02    18.87  32.90  380.37 394.55 8627.50 5035.47 211.23 
 2002-03    20.60  37.07  405.27 399.70 8617.37 4665.48 223.07 
Average (98/99 to 
02/03)  17.65  32.55  375.65 378.08 8163.27 4877.53 206.77 Note:GSDPP: GSDP from Primary Sector; GSDPPR: GSDP from Primary Sector at constant 93/94 
prices 
States= Andhra P, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya P, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, U.P. W. Bengal  
 
The variables tabulated above have been divided into two phases. The first phase 
spans the period 1993/94 to 1997/98 and the second 1998/99 to 2002/03. The only reason 
for this bifurcation is that the first phase data set was provided by the 11
th Finance 
commission and the second by the 12
th FC. Essentially this implies that the FC transfers 
made by the 11
th FC was based on the data available in the what we have called the first 
phase and the 12
th FC transfers is based on the data available in the second phase. 
A comparison of the average per capita own tax revenues shows that own 
revenues as a whole have tripled in the second phase and own tax revenues have 
quadrupled. Clearly there has been progress on this front, however the small base to 
begin with has to be kept in mind. A quick calculation shows that a decade after the path 
breaking Constitutional Amendment Acts own revenues (per capita) still form a mere 9% 
of the total expenditures (per capita). Average increase in total revenues and total 
expenditures (in per capita terms) has been 1.7 times. The income measure that we use 
for the purposes of our study is Gross Domestic Product from Primary Sector. Per capita 
income in nominal terms (GSDPP) shows a growth rate of 44% while in real terms 
(GSDPR) it registers a growth rate of a mere 2%. Thus the key indicators suggest that 
while there has been some progress in terms of increase in own sources of revenue it 
has been very slow and PRIs continue to depend heavily on the upper tiers of 
government for their expenditures.  
This conclusion is further tested by examining some key ratios that we compute 
for our fifteen major states.  
1. Two versions of Revenue Decentralisation Ratio (RD Ratio 1 and 2).  
(a) RD Ratio 1: PRI Own Revenue/ State Own Revenue 
(b) RD Ratio 2: PRI Own Revenue/ State Own Revenue(as suggested by Oommen, 2005) 
2. FA Ratio: Financial Autonomy Ratio: PRI Own Revenue/ Total Expenditure of PRI 
3. DR: Dependency Ratio: (Total Expenditure-Own Revenue)/Total Expenditure 
4. DDR: Change in DR (DRt – DRt-1) 
5. Two versions of Government Size measure 
(a) GS1: PRI Total Revenue/GSDPP 
(b) GS2: PRI Total Expenditure/GSDPP 
Strictly speaking the first four indicators are performance indicators as GS1 and 
GS2 include transfers from higher levels of government. This exercise may be seen as a 
fiscal part of the agenda of constructing a devolution index that is being currently 
undertaken at the behest of MoPR (See, NCAER, 2007). 
Table 2: Key Ratios (Average for 15 states) 
                                                                                                      (%) 
  
RD Ratio 1 
 












1993-94  0.408 0.405  10.83 89.170      3.955 3.885 
1994-95  0.374 0.372  12.46 87.540  -1.630  3.624 3.415 
1995-96  0.375 0.373  11.70 88.298  0.758  3.897 3.864 
1996-97  0.366 0.364  12.16 87.837  -0.462  4.118 3.991 1997-98  0.353 0.351  10.55 89.453  1.616  5.177 5.030 
Average (93/94 to 97/98)  0.375 0.373  11.54  88.460  0.071  4.154  4.037 
 1998-99    0.977 0.962  25.72 74.282  -  3.946 4.175 
 1999-00    0.982 0.964  22.70 77.305  3.023  4.910 4.829 
 2000-01    0.909 0.895  22.74 77.262  -0.043  4.930 4.954 
 2001-02    0.868 0.855  20.87 79.126  1.864  4.525 4.798 
 2002-03    0.851 0.838  21.06 78.941  -0.185  4.690 4.677 
Average (98/99 to 02/03)  0.917 0.903  25.72  77.383  1.165  4.600  4.687 
Notes:  
RDR 1: PRI own Revenue/State Own Revenue,  RDR2: PRI own Revenue/(State Own Revenue+PRI Own Revenue)                                   
GS1: PRI Total Revenue/GSDPP; GS2: PRI Total Expenditure/GSDPP 
States are same as in Table 1 
Table 2 above further vindicates our position that decentralization has progressed 
but only to a very limited extent. Both Revenue Decentralisation ratios (RD1 and RD2) 
show that the average PRI own revenues are below 1% of the states’ own revenue for 
fifteen major states. The Financial Autonomy ratio (FA Ratio) i.e. the extent to which 
expenditures are being funded out of own revenues shows progress during the two phases 
from 11% to 25%. This ratio is effectively the flip side of the Dependency ratio (DR) 
which shows that PRIs depend on upper tiers to the extent of 77%. This is down by 10 
percentage points from 88% in the first phase. Thus while fiscal autonomy of PRIs has 
improved, they are still largely dependent on the higher tiers for their revenue stream. 
The two measures of government size (GS1 and GS2) show that significance of PRIs in 
the state is under 5% and this size has in fact shown a mere 0.5% increase from the first 
phase. It is to be noted that the size includes transfers and hence lends even more weight 
to our argument above.   
Thus the broad story that emerges is clear – Despite the much spoken about 
decentralization de facto fiscal empowerment of rural local bodies has moved at snails’ 
pace. Since it is always the case that the macro picture hides both star performers and 
laggards, it is imperative that to get the complete picture we progress to look at the state-
wise performance. For each of these fifteen states we have obtained the per capita key 
variables for the ten years under consideration (Appendix A) and also computed the key 
ratios and ranked the states based on these key ratios (Appendix B).  From the Tables in 
Appendix A we find that:  
¾  PRI own revenues in per capita terms for the fifteen states has increased from Rs. 9 to 
Rs. 37 i.e. an increase of four times between 1992-93 and 2002-03. In the first phase 
there were four states above average performance viz. Andhra, Goa, Haryana and 
Punjab. In the second phase Andhra seems to have slipped up, Goa and Haryana have 
maintained their above average performance and others like M.P. Maharashtra and 
Punjab have moved up the ladder to above average. 
¾  Grants (per capita) have increased from Rs. 166 in 1998-99 to Rs. 223 in 2002-03. 
We do not have the data on grants for the first phase hence we compared the two end 
points 1998-99 and 2002-03. We find that the states which have received above 
average grants (per capita) are Andhra, Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. 
These states have consistently received grants that are higher than average in all the 
five years. We will have more to comment on this later in the study where we look at 
the shares that FC grants have awarded to the various states and whether these seem 
to reflect the performance of the individual states.   ¾  Total Revenues of PRIs (per capita) have increased 2.5 times from Rs. 160 in 93-94 
to Rs. 405 in 2002-03. Andhra, Gujarat, Karnataka and Rajasthan that registered per 
capita total revenues above average in the first phase. These states have maintained 
this position in the second phase. The only additional state which had above average 
revenues in the second phase is Maharashtra. 
¾  Total Expenditure (per capita) have increased from Rs.158 to Rs.399 during the same 
ten year period.  Andhra, Gujarat, Karnataka and Rajasthan are the four states with 
above average expenditures in the first phase. In the second phase These four states 
have continued to maintain above average expenditures and there are two other states 
of Maharashtra and Kerala which have recorded above average per capita 
expenditures. 
Juxtaposing the total expenditures with own revenues of PRIs we find that in the 
first phase two of the states Karnataka and Rajasthan who registered above average per 
capita expenditures had in fact a poor record on the per capita own revenue front. In the 
second phase the own revenues of Maharashtra seem to have increased (almost) 
dramatically from a mere Rs. 3.89 to Rs.61.91 (This sharp increase may be indicative of a 
change in definition by the two different FCs but we have no alternative but merely to 
sound a word of caution here).  
¾  Finally we looked at per capita incomes from primary sector and found that in the 
first phase there were six states with above average levels viz., Goa, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Punjab. In the second phase two of these states 
Karnataka and Gujarat have not kept pace and have slipped to below average levels.  
¾  When we examined the GSDP from primary sector in real terms (GSDPPR) we found 
that Karnataka and Maharashtra lost their status of having above average per capita 
incomes in the first phase although they did register above average GSDPP in 
nominal terms. In the second phase too Maharashtra although above average in 
nominal income was considered, is to be in the below average group.  
Having obtained some idea about the relative performance of fifteen major states 
and noting the heterogeneity in the various ratios (a fact that we need to exploit as will 
become clear later) we carried out a ranking of the states based on the five different key 
ratios that we defined earlier. Relative ranks of these states for each year and their 
average ranks have been tabulated in Appendix B. To obtain a sharper picture we 
juxtapose the average ratios and ranks for both these phases, in the tables below 
 




Average Ratios  Ranks 













Andhra Pradesh  1.06  1.13  1  5  -4 
Assam    0.09  0.39  14  14  0 
Goa 0.40  0.57  5  8  -3 
Gujarat 0.42  0.63  4  7  -3 
Haryana 0.79  1.18  3  4  -1 Karnataka 0.04  0.56  15  9  6 
Kerala 0.14  3.31  12  1  11 
Madhya Pradesh  0.30  1.97  7  2  5 
Maharashtra 0.10  1.42  13  3  10 
Orissa 0.19  0.31  11  15  -4 
Punjab 0.94  1.12  2  6  -4 
Rajasthan 0.39  0.54  6  10  -4 
Tamil Nadu  0.27  0.44  8  13  -5 
Uttar Pradesh  0.27  0.47  9  12  -3 
West Bengal  0.21  0.48  10  11  -1 
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Andhra Pradesh  1.05  1.12  1  5  -4 
Assam    0.09  0.39  14  14  0 
Goa 0.40  0.57  5  8  -3 
Gujarat 0.42  0.63  4  7  -3 
Haryana 0.79  1.16  3  4  -1 
Karnataka 0.04  0.56  15  9  6 
Kerala 0.14  3.20  12  1  11 
Madhya Pradesh  0.30  1.93  7  2  5 
Maharashtra 0.10  1.40  13  3  10 
Orissa 0.19  0.31  11  15  -4 
Punjab 0.93  1.10  2  6  -4 
Rajasthan 0.39  0.54  6  10  -4 
Tamil Nadu  0.27  0.44  8  13  -5 
Uttar Pradesh  0.27  0.47  9  12  -3 
West Bengal  0.21  0.48  10  11  -1 
 
The two ratios of Revenue Decentralization (RD1 and RD2) make no difference 
to the relative rankings of the states. Andhra was seen to be the top ranker in phase I but 
slipped to 5
th rank in Phase II whereas Kerala which was as far behind as 12
th rank in 
phase I occupies the top slot in phase II.  
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Andhra Pradesh  94.06  96.45  6  12  -6 Assam    91.70  0.67  5  1  4 
Goa 40.93  47.97  1  3  -2 
Gujarat 97.93  97.65  13  13  0 
Haryana 64.42  71.78  2  5  -3 
Karnataka 99.85  98.56  15  15  0 
Kerala 97.25  87.05  11  6  5 
Madhya Pradesh  94.49  71.25  8  4  4 
Maharashtra 96.50  91.29  9  10  -1 
Orissa 98.48  94.66  14  11  3 
Punjab 71.09  40.12  3  2  1 
Rajasthan 97.72  97.70  12  14  -2 
Tamil Nadu  91.17  88.01  4  7  -3 
Uttar Pradesh  94.28  89.08  7  9  -2 
West Bengal  97.01  88.51  10  8  2 
 
The Dependency Ratio (DR) shows the extent of reliance on outside sources of 
revenues. In this case the top ranker is the state with the lowest DR. Goa was the top 
ranker in the first phase but Assam took over in phase two. Karnataka has been the worst 
performer in both phases. Between the two phases the states which have shown 
deterioration in their relative ranks are: Andhra, Goa, Haryana, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu and U.P. The states which have improved their ranks are Assam, Mahya 
Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Punjab and West Bengal. Haryana and Karnataka have 
maintained status quo at nearly the bottom of the ladder. As wirh interpreting any ratio a 
caveat needs to be entered, less dependence may be a good thing but it could also mean 
that the state is not allowing enough to be done by its PRIs, thus we need to read these 
along with other ranks.  
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Andhra Pradesh  0.05  0.15  5  8  -3 
Assam    0.12  0.29  6  10  -4 
Goa -1.28  10.75  2  15  -13 
Gujarat 0.15  -0.02  7  5  2 
Haryana 1.11  6.13  15  14  1 
Karnataka 0.00  0.05  4  7  -3 
Kerala 0.44  -0.81  11  2  9 
Madhya Pradesh  0.89  -2.55  14  1  13 
Maharashtra 0.54  -0.52  13  3  10 
Orissa 0.22  0.60  10  12  -2 
Punjab -2.04  2.75  1  13  -12 
Rajasthan 0.20  0.05  8  6  2 
Tamil Nadu  0.52  0.54  12  11  1 Uttar Pradesh  0.21  0.24  9  9  0 
West Bengal  -0.06  -0.19  3  4  -1 
 
This (DDR) is meant to capture the ‘return of the prodigal’ aspect and introduces 
a dynamic element i.e., it is intended to capture the improvement in performance on the 
part of the states as we do believe that an effort to improve must be rewarded. Punjab was 
the top ranker on this count in the first phase and Madhya Pradesh in the second phase. 
 
(5) Govt Size (GS1): Total Revenue of PRI/Gross State Domestic Product from Primary Sector 
Table 7 
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Andhra Pradesh  6.86  8.26  4  3  1 
Assam    0.07  0.05  15  15  0 
Goa 1.25  1.70  12  9  3 
Gujarat 9.66  16.54  2  1  1 
Haryana 0.20  1.60  14  10  4 
Karnataka 15.15  15.51  1  2  -1 
Kerala 2.97  6.15  7  6  1 
Madhya Pradesh  5.59  2.26  5  8  -3 
Maharashtra 2.19  8.20  9  4  5 
Orissa 4.45  1.06  6  11  -5 
Punjab 0.92  0.51  13  14  -1 
Rajasthan 6.96  6.77  3  5  -2 
Tamil Nadu  2.35  2.85  8  7  1 
Uttar Pradesh  1.71  0.89  11  12  -1 
West Bengal  2.00  0.78  10  13  -3 
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Andhra Pradesh  6.88  9.50  4  4  0 
Assam    0.46  0.05  15  15  0 
Goa 0.79  1.70  12  9  3 
Gujarat 9.83  14.77  2  1  1 
Haryana 0.99  1.60  14  10  4 
Karnataka 12.90  14.73  1  2  -1 
Kerala 2.73  11.08  7  3  4 
Madhya Pradesh  5.59  2.25  5  7  -2 
Maharashtra 2.19  6.95  9  5  4 
Orissa 4.45  1.05  6  11  -5 Punjab 0.97  0.51  13  14  -1 
Rajasthan 6.97  6.29  3  6  -3 
Tamil Nadu  1.96  2.22  8  8  0 
Uttar Pradesh  1.73  0.84  11  12  -1 
West Bengal  2.10  0.78  10  13  -3 
 
The Government Size of PRIs have been captured in two ratios GS1 which is total 
revenues to GSDP from primary sector and GS2 which is defined as total expenditures to 
GSDP from primary sector. Karnataka was the top ranker on this count in the first phase 
and slipped by one position to second in the second phase. Gujarat which was at second 
rank moved up to the top rank in phase 2. At the bottom of the ladder we had Assam, 
Haryana and Punjab in the first phase and Assam, Haryana and West Bengal in the 
second phase. In case of GS2, the other measure of government size, Assam, Goa and 
Punjab were at the bottom of the ladder in the first phase and Assam, Punjab and West 
Bengal in the second phase. Amongst the states that we treat separately later, while 
Karnataka does very well, and Kerala dramatically improves, West Bengal and 
Uttar Pradesh continue to languish at the bottom. 
Having obtained a fairly clear picture of the relatively ‘good, bad and the ugly’ 
performers on the various performance criteria, in Table 9 below we tabulate the shares 
that the allocations made to these states by the 11
th and 12
th FCs.  
Table 9 
State-wise Allocations to PRIs in the 11
th and 12
th Finance Commission 
 
  11
th Finance Commission 
12th Finance 
Commission 






Andhra Pradesh    152.04 2  317.4  4 2  Gainer 
Assam    46.68 12  105.2  12 0  Unaffected 
Goa    1.85 15  3.6  15  0  Unaffected 
Gujarat    69.61 9  186.2  8  -1  Loser 
Haryana    29.42 14  77.6  13  -1  Loser 
Karnataka    78.82 8  177.6  9 1  Gainer 
Kerala    65.92 11  197  7 -4  Loser 
Madhya Pradesh    143.09 3  332.6  3 0  Unaffected 
Maharashtra    131.35 4  396.6  2 -2  Loser 
Orissa    69.11 10  160.6  11 1  Gainer 
Punjab    30.92 13  64.8  14 1  Gainer 
Rajasthan    98.18 6  246  6 0  Unaffected 
Tamil Nadu    93.22 7  174  10  3  Gainer 
Uttar Pradesh    263.83 1  585.6  1 0  Unaffected 
West Bengal    115.55 5  254.2  5 0  Unaffected 
 
The change in the ranks on between these two FC awards have been tabulated in 
Table D1. We find that Andhra, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu have been 
gainers from the 12
th FC allocations vis-à-vis their relative positions in the 11
th FC 
allocation. Assam, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, U.P. and West Bengal have been 
unaffected in their relative rankings. Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala and Maharashtra have 
been losers.  Tables 10 and 11 below put together the change in ranks between the two phases 
on the various performance criteria and juxtapose it with whether the particular state has 
been a net loser or gainer from the Finance Commission allocation. The small exercise 
that we are attempting has the data that was available to the 12
th FC and juxtaposing it 
with the shares that emerged for the various states based on the criteria that the 12
th FC 
used. Obviously, the negative sign implies slippage and positive sign indicates 
improvement, the Table 11 is compiled using information culled from Tables 9 and 10.      
Table 10: Change in Ranks on Various Key Criteria  
(93/94 to 97/98 Phase and 98/99 to 02-03 phase) 
  RD1 RD2  DR  DDR  GS1  GS2  FC 
Andhra Pradesh    -4 -4  -6  -3  1  0  2 
Assam    0  0 4 -4 0 0  0 
Goa    -3 -3  -2  -13  3  3  0 
Gujarat    -3  -3 0 2 1 1 -1 
Haryana    -1  -1  -3 1 4 4 -1 
Karnataka    11  11  5 9 1 4 1 
Kerala    5 5  4  13 -3  -2  -4 
Madhya Pradesh    10 10  -1  10  5  4  0 
Maharashtra    -4  -4 3 -2 -5 -5 -2 
Orissa    -4 -4  1  -12  -1  -1  1 
Punjab    -4  -4 -2 2 -2 -3 1 
Rajasthan    -5  -5  -3 1 1 0 0 
Tamil Nadu    -3  -3 -2 0 -1 -1 3 
Uttar Pradesh    -1  -1 2 -1 -3 -3  0 
West Bengal    -4 -4  -6  -3  1  0  0 
 
Table 11: Improvement/Deterioration in Relative Ranks on Various Key Criteria 
vis-à-vis relative awards of FCs  
(93/94 to 97/98 Phase and 98/99 to 02-03 phase) 
 
  RD1 RD2 DR DDR GS1 GS2 FC 
Andhra Pradesh    - - - - +  Status Quo  Gainer 
Assam    Status Quo  Status Quo  + -  Status Quo  Status Quo  Unaffected 
Goa    - - - - + +  Unaffected 
Gujarat    - -  Status Quo  + + +  Loser 
Haryana    - - -  + + +  Loser 
Karnataka    + + + + + +  Gainer 
Kerala    + + + + -  Deterioration  Loser 
Madhya 
Pradesh    + + - + + +  Unaffected 
Maharashtra    - -  +  - - -  Loser 
Orissa    - -  +  - - -  Gainer 
Punjab    - - -  + - -  Gainer 
Rajasthan    - - -  + +  Status Quo  Unaffected 
Tamil Nadu    - - -  Status Quo  - -  Gainer 
Uttar Pradesh    - -  +  - - -  Unaffected West Bengal    - - - - +  Status Quo 
Unaffected 
Note: “+” indicates  Improvement and “- ” a deterioration 
 
We find that Andhra, was a net gainer in its relative position from the 12
th FC 
award but it scored poorly on our performance indicators of RD1, RD2, DR and DDR. It 
maintained status quo in case of GS2 and only improved its position in case of GS2. GS2 
is the share of total revenues to GSDP. Clearly total revenues increased on account of 
grants and not due to any effort of the state to improve its own revenues. At the other 
extreme we find Kerala which has improved in four of the criteria but has been a net loser 
from the 12
th FC award thus having a small government size (GS1 and GS2). Some 
others like Gujarat have lost out although they fared well in case of DR and DDR. Others 
like West Bengal have been lucky to have fared poorly on all criteria and have their 
relative rank as being unaffected. There are however, states like Karnataka, which have 
also been duly rewarded for good performance. The case of Tamil Nadu is unique as it is 
noteworthy. 
To obtain a synoptic picture from the rankings on the various criteria we 
computed a ‘Grand Rank’ by aggregating all the ranks, thereby making the (somewhat 
simplistic) assumption of according equal weight to each of our criteria. These Grand 
Ranks are separately obtained for the two different phases and following our previous 
pattern a change in the rank of each state is obtained. Whilst explicitly admitting to their 
rather crude nature, we tabulate and present the Grand Ranks below:   
 
 
TABLE 12: GRAND RANK 
 
   Phase I  Phase II 
Change 
in Rank 
Andhra Pradesh  1  5  -4 
Assam    15  14  1 
Goa 4  9  -5 
Gujarat 2  4  -2 
Haryana 8  7  1 
Karnataka 9  6  3 
Kerala 13  1  12 
Madhya Pradesh  6  2  4 
Maharashtra 14  3  11 
Orissa 12  15  -3 
Punjab 3  10  -7 
Rajasthan 5  8  -3 
Tamil Nadu  7  11  -4 
Uttar Pradesh  11  13  -2 
West Bengal  10  12  -2 
 
These Grand Ranks show that the states which have shown an improvement are 
Assam, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra with Kerala 
topping the list of the improved states being closely followed by Maharashtra. Whereas 
Tamil Nadu which is a gainer has further slipped, West Bengal has slipped further to languish in the lower echelon. The broad conclusion that seems to emerge from the 
small exercise that we have carried out and which is reported in the above table is 
that the shares allocated to the various states by the 12
th FC from the funds set aside 
for PRIs does not seem to be in consonance with the incremental performance of 
these states as per the fiscal decentralization criteria that we have used. Further 
there is a disjunction between the criteria used by the two FCs. If one goes into the 
political economy aspects (especially partisan politics dealing with who is in power 
at center and states) it is clear that there is no pattern here. As an aside, this 
confirms the commonly held view about CFCs being non-partisan. 
It has often been argued that any formula based transfer will favor some states and 
be unfair to others and that FC awards are unbiased to the extent that they are based on 
objective criteria. It is by no means our intent to charge the 12
th FC transfers with alleged 
bias. The limited purpose of our exercise is to question and suggest a re-look at the 
criteria and the weights that were set out by the 12
th FC for inter se distribution of the 
funds set aside for PRIs so as to reward states for any efforts made by the states to 
empower the rural local bodies. Clearly the criteria of ‘Revenue Effort’ alone (with a 
weight of 20%) in the formula for inter se distribution of the 12
th FC funds wasn’t 
adequate to capture the performance of the states on the decentralization front. Let us 
now turn to the buoyancy of revenues. 
  
IV.2  Buoyancy of Own Revenues: Tax and Non-Tax 
We have attempted to examine the buoyancies of Own revenues (both tax and 
non-tax separately) by estimating a double log regression. We have estimated these 
buoyancies for all fifteen states put together using panel data estimation procedure (for 15 
states and 10 years) and independently for each state too. The time period examined 
spans the entire ten year period 1993-94 to 2002-03 and also the two sub-periods (or 
phases) that we have identified previously i.e. Phase I (1993-94 to 1997-98) and Phase II 
(1998-99 to 2002-03). A familiar qualification though, data availability constraint does 
not allow us to have results for more recent periods and the same makes us run regression 
for 5 year period (on which the purist econometrician will undoubtedly frown). 
Own Revenue 
















       





  (5.19) 


















Haryana 5  1.113253**  0.4994647 2.186307** (6.37)  (1.38) (4.89) 
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The aggregate buoyancy for fifteen states shows that the buoyancy of own 
revenue exceeds unity for the ten year period. However, when we look at the two sub-
period or phases that we have identified we find the buoyancies to be 0.64 in the first 
phase and this seems to have reduced in the second phase to 0.45. This deterioration 
shows up when we look at the buoyancy for each state in the second phase and find that a 
larger number of states have in fact shown a deterioration on the own revenue buoyancy 
and slipped to below unity in the second phase. 
In Phase I we have Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, U.P., West Bengal which have registered buoyancies to slip 
below unity. In Phase II Haryana, Kerala and U.P. have shown an improvement in their 
buoyancy. The states of Goa, M.P. and Maharashtra are three states which did have above 
unity buoyancy in Phase I but have allowed the buoyancies to slip below unity in Phase 
II. Keeping in mind the fact that the exercise is with remarkably low degrees of freedom, 
we would still believe that there is a lesson to be taken from the low levels as well as 
slippages that call for improvement. 
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As in the case of aggregate Own revenues we find that the aggregate buoyancy for 
fifteen states shows that the buoyancy of own tax revenue exceeds unity for the ten year 
period. However, when we look at the two sub-period or phases that we have identified 
we find the buoyancies to be 0.47 in the first phase and this seems to have reduced in the 
second phase to 0.40. This deterioration shows up when we look at the buoyancy for each 
state in the second phase and find that a large number of states have in fact shown a 
deterioration on the own tax buoyancy and slipped to below unity in the second phase. 
¾  For the entire ten year period the states with buoyancy less than unity are Andhra, 
Punjab, U.P, West Bengal 
¾  For Phase I the states with buoyancy less than unity are: Gujarat Karnataka, Orissa, 
Punjab, Tamil Nadu, U.P., W.Bengal 
¾  For Phase II the states with buoyancy less than unity are: Andhra, Assam, Goa,  
Gujarat, Kerala, M.P., Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, U.P. 
 Own Non-Tax Revenue 
 
















        






Assam 2  1.613386** 
(6.87) 
N.A.  0.9933402** 
(8.09) 














































































        
 
For the aggregate of fifteen states we find that there has been some improvement 
in buoyancy of Non-Tax revenues in Phase II vis-à-vis Phase I. However, there are nine 
states in phases II which show buoyancy less than unity while there were eight in Phase I 
with less than unity buoyancy. The states which have shown a deterioration are Goa, 
Karnataka (although buoyancy is greater than unity in both phases), Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Expectedly we find that the tax buoyancies are less than the non-tax revenues. The case of taxes is easily explained in familiar terms 
(low base and regulatory constraints) although we may not agree with the position. 
But non-tax revenues are under researched and could be hiked by rationalization of 
various charges. Over all, we believe that whilst the arena for operations (of both tax 
and non-tax sources) can and need to be expanded, even with the given situation there 
is scope for better exploitation of the potential that exists. 
 
IV.3  End Notes on the All India Situation 
  The diversity in attainment, and flux in performance is quite clear from the 
foregoing analysis and some of the implications in terms of increasing local autonomy 
are obvious and do not bear repetition. What it also does is to call into serious question 
the general (consensual) feeling that the revenues as well as the fiscal base of all the PRIs 
is uniformly poor leading to the corollary that not much can be done about the increasing 
transfer dependency and the inevitable inertia towards attempting anything new, in short 
encouraging laziness, apathy and cynicism. We wish to strongly suggest two pronged 
approach in this context. First we wish to argue that the picture in fact is quite 
encouraging (see Rajaraman 2000) and that much can be done by way of own revenue 
increases. The obligatory tax handles have to be seriously implemented along with the 
floor rates prescribed in a mandatory manner. The water irrigation rates in Maharashtra 
with the in-built graded increase, or the road toll tax in Madhya Pradesh (Bhopal-Dewas) 
are examples. This has to contend with the problems due to ‘nearness to taxpayer’ and 
have to be worked around. The issues of agricultural levies that are crop specific will (not 
a very popular subject) as suggested by Indira Rajaraman amongst others will have to be 
faced (even though agriculture is a state subject). Proper design of incentives for such 
effort is necessary (with implication for design of transfers) and will help expand the 
fiscal base of the PRIs so that the trade-off between efficiency and equity is carefully 
worked out. The UP example of potential revenues (later in the piece) should be an eye 
opener. Apart from granting greater taxation powers to the PRIs, in any case, newer 
revenue handles will have to be innovatively unearthed, this is especially important 
because the GST regime might take away some of the existing ones (see Govind Rao, 
2008). It is essential that non-revenue sources have to be seriously rationalized and 
properly tapped. This is huge under researched area that demands our attention. Many 
times the argument is advanced that the requirements are so huge that clearly such efforts 
will not help solve the problem. This is true, however what is not recognized is that such 
efforts help create a far healthier balance sheet for the PRIs which then are in a position 
to present a rating and a borrowing-risk that is viable if not attractive to the Financial 
Institutions that can then be approached for underwriting or taking exposure, which takes 
us to the second prong of our suggestion. Some of the states are devolving large amounts 
of the state plans to the PRIs. Already the cooperatives and scheduled commercial banks 
and NABARD should be looking at bankable viable projects. This needs to be done as a 
symbiotic effort on all the stake holders (governments at various levels as well as NGOs). 
The idea can be extended to creation of virtual entities formed by considering different 
PRIs. The entire set of PRIs will have to be classified into different classes according to 
economic criteria and strengths and then schemes can be worked out for ‘cross-overs’ 
that will allow even the weaker PRIs to access credit. Such a scheme has been proposed 
by us (see Pethe and Lalvani, 2006) in the case of Urban Local Bodies. Indeed, we would suggest the coming together of some PRIs with their urban counter parts too. There is 
something to be said for a ‘regional’ approach in these matters (see Pethe and Lalvani, 
2007), for example consider the case of MMR which is being looked at for Mumbai 
Transformation Project. This implies rather than looking at urban and rural in 
exclusive terms, we should be looking at the entire space as one integrated 
continuum dotted with institutions that are local bodies. The experience in terms of 
water aggregation models is well documented (especially in World Bank literature) and 
some lessons are to be taken from the TNUDF experience. We recognize that this kind of 
experiment is not possible in a uniform and all pervasive fashion, but our argument is that 
we should not shy from non-homothetic strategic initiatives for this reason and where 
ever possible, try it with full vigor.  
V.  Core: The Maharashtra Story 
  Apart from the fact that Maharashtra has emerged as one of the fastest improving 
states by our ranking scheme (covering only the fiscal devolution), the other reason for 
including this section is that given the proximity of the authors to the ‘mantralya’ it was 
felt that some more data will be available for Maharashtra than has been at the all India 
level. It was felt that giving this as a prototype would also allow us to set up some 
formats which, should the data be available for all the Indian states, could be replicated. 
Finally, in its pronouncements Maharashtra government never fails to show off its 
pedigree in that it had PRIs well entrenched much before (about three decades prior) the 
passage of the 73
rd CAA. Let us look at the fiscal performance of the PRIs in 
Maharashtra and then comment on some of the lacunae in processes. 
V.1  Fiscal Performance of PRIs in Maharashtra 
  The inter-state analysis of the fiscal performance of PRIs indicated that the state 
of Maharashtra has performed not unreasonably (especially if one sees the improvement) 
on the decentralization indicators and yet been a loser from the 12
th Finance Commission 
award. Since we had access to some detailed data for Maharashtra and since regional 
variations within Maharashtra has been the subject of much discussion in recent past, we 
undertook a small exercise to take a closer look to see if we could zero in on specific 
regions which were lagging behind. The three tier PRIs in Maharashtra comprises of Zilla 
Parishad at the district level, Panchayat Samiti at the intermediate level and Gram/Village 
Panchayat. Of the three, it is the lowest tier that is of most significant and needs to be 
empowered to reach out to the large rural society. It is the expenditures and receipts and 
the composition of this tier of Gram Panchayats that forms the focal point of this section 
of our study.  Whilst the details of data (albeit for only one or two additional years) were 
available at a level of disaggregation, we thought it prudent (given our mandate) to 
restrict ourselves to division level analysis. 
The State of Maharashtra has been divided into six administrative divisions viz., 
Konkan, Nashik, Pune, Aurangabad, Amravati and Nagpur. The per capita District 
Domestic Product from Primary sector and rural population of the various divisions are 
tabulated below to give a clear idea about the size of these various divisions. 
 
District Domestic Product from Primary Sector and Population 
(PER CAPITA) 
                                                                                                       (Rs.) 
                  
   2000- 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 RURAL 2001  POPULATION 
(2001 census) 
KONKAN DIV.  6074.31  6799.19 7717.20 9213.68 8839.10  6,193,544 
NASHIK DIV.  6516.25  7583.42 7872.48 9341.40 10120.26  11,294,179 
PUNE DIV.  9034.48  9702.18 8793.23 10265.72 11555.21  12,489,965 
AURANGABAD 
DIV. 5929.91  6039.15 6796.48 6650.64 6543.53  11,795,366 
AMRAVATI DIV.  6643.29  7754.25 7689.07 7439.11 6212.51  7,312,251 
NAGPUR DIV.  8913.90  10286.23 10717.91 11615.84 10037.55  6,692,342 
MAHARASHTRA  7211.40 7990.90 8151.23 8988.69 9020.73  55,777,647 
    
Std  dev  1411.33 1651.70 1359.28 1817.50 2126.55  2855888 
mean  7185.36 8027.40 8264.39 9087.73 8884.69  9296275 
C.V.  0.20 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.24  0.31 
 
Per Capita District Domestic Product from Primary Sector (DDP) has risen from 
Rs. 7211 to Rs. 9020 in the five years under consideration. Pune division registered the 
highest per capita income in 2000/01. It was surpassed by Nagpur Division in 2001/02 
which remained the top ranker for three years. It was only in 2004/05 that Pune division 
once again overtook it. The Coefficient of Variation shows that the divergence between 
the divisions has widened. 
  The contribution of each of the divisions to the primary sector would also serve to 
indicate the prominence of each of these divisions in the rural economy of Maharashtra.  
 












2005  Average 
KONKAN DIV.  9.35 9.45 10.51 11.38 10.88  10.37 
NASHIK DIV.  18.30 19.22 19.56 21.04 22.72  20.28 
PUNE DIV.  28.05 27.19 24.16 25.57 28.68  26.72 
AURANGABAD 
DIV. 17.39 15.98 17.63 15.65 15.34  16.34 
AMRAVATI 
DIV. 12.08 12.72 12.37 10.85 9.03  11.33 
NAGPUR DIV.  14.83 15.44 15.78 15.51 13.35  14.96 
 
  Pune division has consistently been the leader during the period 2000/01 to 
2004/05 with average contribution to primary sector DDP of 27%, followed by Nashik at 
20%. The smallest contribution has always been that of Amravati division.  
  The size of the Village or Gram Panchayat government is approximated by total 
revenue as a proportion of DDP from primary sector. The size of the Gram Panchayat 
division-wise has been tabulated below:   
 
Measure of Govt. Size for Village Panchayat 














KONKAN DIV.  2.508 2.527 2.290 2.293 2.652  2.454 
NASHIK DIV.  1.569 1.505 1.565 1.459 1.461  1.512 
PUNE DIV.  1.415 1.466 2.034 1.855 1.817  1.717 
AURANGABAD DIV.  1.239 1.402 1.535 2.307 2.288  1.754 
AMRAVATI DIV.  1.120 1.277 1.471 1.863 2.681  1.683 
NAGPUR DIV.  1.077 1.143 1.193 1.292 1.569  1.255 
MAHARASHTRA  1.429 1.489 1.679 1.806 1.944  1.669 
 
  The share of Total revenue of Gram Panchayats in Maharashtra is a mere 1.6% of 
the primary sector DDP of Maharashtra. Division-wise we find that the largest share is 
that of Konkan Division at 2.4% and the smallest is that of Nagpur of 1.25%. There 
appears to be no relation between the share of contribution and the size of the 
government.   
  The total revenue of Gram Panchayats in Maharashtra comes from (1) Taxes 
which include tax on buildings and land, conservancy and public health tax, lighting tax, 
water charges (2) other income and (3) Grants from Zilla Parishad/Panchayat 
Samiti/Government grants and also via the D.R.D.A. (through which the Centrally 
Sponsored schemes are routed). Table below provides the shares of these various sources 
of revenue.   

















1. Total Tax Revenue/Total 
Revenue  33.77 38.23 40.05 37.36 37.25  37.48 
shares of various taxes in Total Tax Revenue 
(a) Tax.on Buildings and 
Land  48.51 52.94 54.93 56.06 55.56  54.15 
(b) Conservancy and Public 
Health Tax  5.85 5.62 4.92 4.73 5.96  5.38 
(c)  Lighting  Tax  8.33 6.50 6.68 7.20 6.58  6.96 
(d)  Water  Charges  37.30 34.94 33.48 32.02 31.89  33.51 
         
2. Other Income  18.92 16.04 16.20 14.90 14.57  15.86 
         
3.  Grants/  Total  Revenue  47.31 45.73 43.75 47.73 48.18  46.66 
 
  Total Tax revenues (own taxes) have on an average contributed 37% to the total 
revenues available to Panchayats, Grants 47% and other incomes 16%. Among the taxes, 
the tax on buildings and land have been the major contributor (54% of total tax revenues) 
followed by water charges (33.5% of the tax revenue). Conservancy and public health tax and lighting tax have contributed 5% and 7% respectively. Fiscal Autonomy of these 
panchayats can be gauged by computing the extent to which total expenditures have been 
funded out of their own tax revenues. Table below tabulates these ratios over the five 
year period.  
Fiscal Autonomy 









Average  40.19 
 
  On an average 40% of total expenditures of gram panchayats have come from 
own taxes. What is important to note from the above table is that there hasn’t been any 
significant improvement in these shares over the five year period. In fact, there has been a 
steady decline over the last three years from 42.7% in 2002-03 to 39.2% in 2004-05. A 
division-wise break up of the Fiscal Autonomy ratios is tabulated below: 












KONKAN  DIV.  44.95 46.42 49.51 49.25 47.69  47.75 
NASHIK  DIV.  39.58 43.60 52.16 46.05 42.86  44.98 
PUNE  DIV.  41.50 40.10 40.93 37.69 40.99  40.12 
AURANGABAD 
DIV.  30.69 34.86 65.56 28.31 28.80  36.36 
AMRAVATI  DIV.  30.92 35.38 35.12 38.54 32.64  34.70 
NAGPUR  DIV.  34.59 39.75 42.26 45.67 41.36  41.27 
MAHARASHTRA  38.20 40.47 42.80 40.18 39.29  40.24 
  Konkan Divison is seen to be the most autonomous and has also shown an 
improvement over the years. Pune and Aurangabad are the two divisions where 
deterioration is to be noticed on this count.  
 













Admn.&  Estab.  14.22  14.51 15.34 14.67 14.67 14.71 Water  Supply  13.08  14.56 13.45 13.41 12.65 13.37 
Conservancy & 
Public Health  8.88  7.44 8.48 8.84 9.57 8.72 
Public  Work  26.81  30.00 28.41 30.70 30.33 29.49 
Other*  37.01  33.49 34.32 32.38 32.78 33.71 
 
  We find that the largest share has been allocated to Public works which is a 
desirable trend and also the fact that there has been some increase in this share over the 
five year period. Conservancy and Public health have small average share of merely 8.7% 
in the total expenditures. Some small increase is noticeable here but clearly there is need 
for increasing this component of expenditures. Expenditure on water supply has remained 
more or less constant as has the share on expenditure and administration. By and large 
the picture that emerges is of status quo. No sharp hike in the share of expenditure 
on public health or public works is noticeable despite the hype created about 
focusing on improving the situation in rural areas.   
  A division-wise classification of the various taxes and expenditure categories as 
has been presented below would be useful to gauge the regional variation in the revenues 
collected and the expenditures incurred. 
Contribution of Divisions in Average Collection  















Tax.on Buildings and 
Land  25.33 14.59 29.84  10.81  6.90  12.48 
Conservancy and Public 
Health Tax  10.81 26.95 29.83  11.51  15.66  5.24 
Lighting Tax  8.45 22.61  24.57 19.57 13.66  12.00 
Water Charges  7.34 25.94  23.81 18.70 12.60  11.62 
Total Tax Revenue  17.30 20.05 27.45  15.80  9.69  11.50 
Z.P./Panchayat 
Samiti/Govt.Grants  15.56 11.72 34.69  18.54  9.85  8.32 
D.R.D.A.Grants  10.25 15.84 22.50  22.20  15.17 14.06 
Other# Revenues  17.56 26.31 26.17  18.08  9.06  8.45 
Total Revenue  15.09 18.13 27.30  17.17  11.14 11.18 
Admn.& Estab.  13.97 20.30 31.28  14.13  9.48  10.84 
Water Supply  10.25 24.23 29.33  18.38  9.85  13.99 
Conservancy & Public 
Health  12.29 22.46 31.42  12.30  9.35  12.15 
Public Work  16.58 12.52 30.12  19.62  10.07 10.90 
Other Exp.  15.41 17.99 21.91  17.90  14.07 12.71 
Total Expenditure  14.58 17.94 27.54  17.48  11.24 11.22  
  The major contributor in the total tax revenue of Gram Panchayats has been Pune 
Division. It has contributed on an average 27% of the total tax revenue with the next 
highest contributor being Nashik which has contributed 18%. The smallest contributions 
have come from Amravati and Nagpur Divisions. Naturally therefore on the expenditure 
side too the highest spending division both on administration and on public works has 
been Pune division.    
  The surprising statistic that caught our attention in the above table is that Pune 
Division received the highest share of DRDA and ZP/Panchayat Samiti/Government 
Grants. Our tables on district income had shown Pune Division to have the highest per 
capita income thus these grants and also the fact that Pune Division was seen to be a 
relatively poor performer on the Fiscal Autonomy front and in fact has shown 
deterioration on this count over the five years. Whereas, Pune Division has, been the 
largest contributor to the total tax collections and to that extent needs to be rewarded, this 
cannot justify the largest share of grants being directed to the Pune Division. It is in 
perhaps violation of both equity and efficiency (especially former) concerns but more 
importantly, brings to light the ad-hocism in intergovernmental transfers from state 
governments in the absence of a well thought out formulae along the lines of the 
CFCs.     
  The regional variations that we have highlighted for the state of Maharashtra is 
merely illustrative but has brought home the point that we once again re-assert: there is 
an urgent need to tap all possible resources to bring together a comparable data at a 
disaggregative level for PRIs across the states of India.   
 
V.2  Some Further Issues in Maharashtra 
Maharashtra has done some things right (especially as captured by our ranking 
scheme). For example it has delegated the financial powers of considerable magnitude to 
the PRIs and transferred several schemes to them. Indeed twenty years back (long before 
the talk of budget window) it started the practice of compilation of a large matrix on 
financial year basis depicting the fund flows from the line departments to the PRIs. The 
state has also instituted ‘incentive awards’ under the Yeswantrao Chavan Panchayat 
Abhiyan. However, there are some problems with regard to other than purely fiscal 
matters that warrant urgent attention and improvement. Despite the continued assertion of 
the State about ‘knowing it and having done it all’ even prior to the 73
rd CAA, the 
performance is not what it should be, and we are not just talking about financial matter 
dealt with in the earlier subsection. Indeed because of the lack of clean slate, we find a 
overhang of older processes and practices untouched by the new impulse. This overhang 
is clearly reflected in the mindsets that are in need of urgent change. It might be prudent 
to undo and redo some of the things, for example in case of activity mapping, instead of 
than saying that ‘we don’t need to do it afresh since we have already done it’ (albeit in 
some other context). Just to cite one instance, the capacity utilization of a progressive 
state like Maharashtra should be clearly better than 23% and 16% in the last two years in 
case of the flagship PMGSY!   The fact that only 9% utilization is reported in case of 12
th 
FC funds does not encourage one. Neither does the consequence of the prospect of the 
impending vicious cycle of no utilization certificate and so no further grants. The 
common knowledge that there are around 50000 assets created at the local level that have fallen into disuse is not particularly heartening. Finally the convenient and easy 
interpretation of expenditure control regimen has meant that large number of vacant staff 
positions are reported (compression of revenue expenditure?!). No wonder that the work 
will suffer 
Simply put, the SFCs, sans tokenism, have been given a go by. Let us see the 
details. The first SFC was set up in April 1994 and its report was submitted in November 
1996. The State Govt. accepted the report with modifications in July 1997 and ATR was 
submitted to the State Legislature in April 1997. The Second SFC was set up in May 
1999 and its report was submitted in October 2002. The State Govt. accepted the report in 
October 2002 and ATR was submitted to State Legislature during the Budget Session i.e. 
August 2003.  The Third Commission has been set up and report is awaited (this despite 
the common knowledge that the said report has been submitted some time ago). This is 
the trite reporting through government documents and review reports. We quote some of 
the phrases that require no further comment in that they show a peculiar mind set (some 
times euphemistically termed as bureaucratic cleverness) and/ or utter lack of 
coordination between government departments but a clear and blatant disregard for any 
right to information. About SFC, details of recommendations of the Second SFC and 
ATR of the State Government are not available, this after passage of so much time 
after submission. Or in the context of transferred scheme, ‘the quantum is not given’ 
and in context delegation of financial powers to PRIs, ‘details of financial resources or 
tax collection have not been given’ or indeed although the by the ‘good practice’ of 
financial and revenue accounts being submitted to auditor general, it is claimed that this 
is done every year, ‘however no details available’. This in the documents and review 
reports of the Government of Maharashtra! Need we say more?! The point is not to be 
critical of the persons, indeed, our experience is that they are all quite cooperative and 
want to help. This is merely to point out the systemic fault lines. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General’s report, as always, makes interesting 
reading (though that the details are regularly submitted by GoM and the CAG report is on 
the Web which is great!). The diversion of funds and sometimes the FC grants being 
passed off as ‘state grants’ is pointed out. Lack of reconciliation of accounts multiplicity 
of bank accounts by DRDA (even in some cases for the same scheme!) non-reportage of 
physical targets, non utilization of funds non distribution of even the statutory grants 
makes for familiar reading. DRDA continues to be powerful and much happens outside 
the gamut of PRIs is sad, to say the least. 
VI.  Core: Some More on Some States: 
  Whilst detailed analysis of panchayati raj finances is not possible along the lines 
of Maharashtra for lack of consistent, updated data, in this section we use the inputs from 
the states to MoPR, apart from excellent studies (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007), World 
Bank (2004), Oomen (2004)) which research some of the other states so as to unearth 
some of the things attempted and document some good practices, especially those which 
according to us has a bearing on the finances of PRIs. The states that we will be looking 
at are, Kerala, Karnataka, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh apart from Maharashtra which 
has been commented upon in an earlier section. This sub-sample is largely defined by the 
dictum of ‘searching for the pin under the light’ but does happen to have amongst it the 
most populous state as well as those which are supposedly best performing state w.r.t. 
PRIs or have a pedigree and experience in PRIs that pre-dates the passage of 73
rd CAA.  VI.1  Nature of Transfer 
  There was a decision some time ago, that the states will provide a window for 
PRIs within the respective state budgets. Implementation on this front has been rather 
poor. The response – in a majority of cases – unfortunately has been one that displays 
apathy, lethargy and even worse deliberate procrastination. Sometimes there have been 
reasons advanced for this in a clever bureaucratic fashion that would be amusing except 
that they are seriously disconcerting. Most of the states continue the practice of 
transferring the funds through the line departments through routine project /scheme line 
items to the Rural Development Departments or the parallel bodies such as DRDA s or to 
the commissioner of Panchayati Raj. Then they are sent onwards to the BDOs or 
Magistrates or in some cases to the ZPs for onward transmission to the lower tiers. The 
whole point about the decision for a budget window was two fold, one, to reduce the 
transaction number and nodes so that the cost of transaction would be reduced and 
efficiency ensured; two it would be easy to find out the actual transfers to PRIs through 
the budget in an easy fashion enabling researchers and policy makers to evaluate and 
monitor the transfer efficiency. State level bureaucracy raises serious questions about and 
show scant respect to the capacity of lower level functionaries (both officials and 
elected). There should be a serious introspection at the State level whether laxity in 
providing a budget window is an act of omission due to capacity or an act of commission 
due to intent. To be sure some of the states have started moving towards the goal, by 
creating newer item-heads that reflect the funds to be transferred to PRIs, this could then 
be presumably be clubbed to form a budget window operated directly by the finance 
department. A caveat needs to be entered here, although a good move, this will be really 
useful if there is uniformity in practices across states. In a very recent meeting of 
empowered chief ministers meeting (GoI, 2008) it has been reported that such budget 
windows have been created in seven States. It is to be hoped that this will be emulated by 
others quickly. Of course, it has to be recognized that this window is only a necessary 
condition for the underlying goal. If the grants are not released regularly or in a 
predictable manner – as reported by some states – then not much is achieved. It has been 
reported that the many of the above lacunae are present not only where the funds 
emanating from the state government are concerned but indeed much the same is true for 
even grants that come under Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). It is not unknown – 
within government and bureaucracy – that even agency nodes assume power through 
(wrongly) perceived sense of control which leads to such behavior. Even where the CSS 
funds are transferred quickly, they do not go directly to PRIs but to (parallel) DRDAs, 
who then assume considerable control over the disbursal. These are clearly important 
governance issues and needs to be tackled effectively. Some of the states have started – 
due to prodding by higher level governments and authorities – to take measures to track 
the fund movement and have decided to keep the limit for the time from receipt to 
transfer to two weeks. To be sure, there are some good practices, although not as well 
distributed across states. For example at least in case of CSS funds there are states that 
quite directly transfer them to PRI bank accounts (all tiers) automatically through the 
Fund Transfer Software developed by NIC, which incidently is a result of a report by a 
Task Force appointed by the MoPR. This is a triumph of IT enablement. There are some 
good practices where separate fungible funds are created within the Treasury (much like 
the consolidated fund) and the panchayats are allowed to open bank accounts through which the transfers are made. That these funds are largely non-lapsable (across financial 
years) is enabling provision at least till the PRIs gain greater capabilities. Also the 
practice of determining both the time and magnitude of such transfers is an empowering 
and efficient practice that will enable the PRIs to feel secure and informed in making 
their expenditure plans. There is a welcome and a palpable reduction in the transfer time 
from two months to two days! Thus, the picture with regard to transfer of funds although 
frustrating, is not all bleak. The ‘best practices’ as put in place by some states need to be 
documented and widely circulated, with a view to emulation by all the states. 
VI.2  Functioning of SFCs 
  This is a huge area which has been widely researched (see e.g., World 
Bank/ Geeta Sethi (2004), India Infrastructure Report (2003) as also Shubham Chaudhary 
(2007)). Indeed in this same report it is treated elsewhere. However, the public domain 
knowledge about these reports continues to be woefully sparse. Our concern in this very 
brief section is with the financial aspects of SFC reports. The State Finance Commissions 
have been required by the Constitutional mandate as a part of the 73
rd CAA. However 
they have not been very successful for a few reasons. First amongst them is that whilst 
they have mostly been set up rather mechanically, not much thought seems to have gone 
into the exercise in the composition of the commission. The timing of setting these up 
have also not been synchronized with the Central Finance Commissions (which work like 
clockwork) thus depriving Central Finance Commissions of the crucial inputs as 
envisaged. It can be seen that some of the SFCs have taken their job seriously and come 
up with useful recommendations, however by and large most of these have been rejected 
and when they have been accepted (in principle) the States have dragged their feet in the 
matter of actual implementation of the awards. There are only few states that have 
rigorously kept to a time table of setting up SFCs. Fewer still have actually gone through 
the process of acceptance and ATR by the respective governments and legislatures. There 
is varied experience where the newly formed states are only now initiating the process of 
setting up their first SFC Chattisgarh and Jharkhand). Again, the quality of the reports by 
the SFC in different states shows heterogeneity. Some of the SFCs have recommended 
revenue (tax and non-tax) (Andhra) and sometimes only the tax revenue (Assam), shares 
to be devolved as well as the sharing between the urban and rural local bodies. The inter 
se distribution between the different tiers is also recommended based on criteria that vary 
form simple and straight forward to complicated and detailed/ formula based formats that 
reflect social concerns (always where there is data to implement such recommendations). 
Some have gone to the extent of working out first level demarcation in terms of advanced 
ordinary and backward PRIs along with weights. Recommendations about assignments of 
taxes such as advertisement, profession and property tax have routinely been made. In 
addition some SFCs have suggested newer handles for revenue mobilization or 
improvement in the efficiency of the existing ones. Some have recommended (and 
implemented) special grants (for weak PRIs as well as incentive grants for well 
performing ones. 
For all this mostly the end result is non acceptance of recommendations by the 
SFCs. It is difficult to justify the efforts taken by the SFCs resulting in ad-hoc, non-
formulaic and paltry grants being handed down to the PRIs. It is surprising to note that 
even after several years have passed after the submission of reports, states in their 
response to the query use phrases like ‘accepted in principle’, or ‘under active consideration’, or ‘yet to be ascertained’ (Assam, Tripura and Goa) or indeed the more 
drastic, ‘details are not available’ (Maharashtra). In most cases even the conditional 
acceptance means non-acceptance of recommendations that have financial implications. 
Mercifully there are exceptions wherein not only the recommendations have been 
accepted but actual implementation and quick releases of funds have happened (Gujarat, 
Haryana, Sikkim and Punjab). In a rare case, rather than awaiting report of the next FC, a 
state (Haryana) has gone ahead and released advanced grants. Several new schemes have 
been initiated with strides in implementation backed by financial releases is another best 
practice that is reported. This shows the proactive stance of the State and should be 
considered a good practice especially in contrast to the generally prevalent attitude of 
finding excuses or shifting blame. In some cases like J&K, one finds parallel (also Pani-
panchayats in Orrissa) bodies like the Halqua Panchayats that are to be devolved funds. 
While they may be doing good work whether such parallel bodies are to be allowed is a 
moot point. Quantum of untied and programmatic schematic funds that reaches each 
Panchayat is as high as 20 to 30% in some cases (Himachal and Kerala). The practice of 
supporting weak panchayats and creating incentives is laudable (e;g;, Haryana, Punjab, 
Maharashtra). The enabling practice in some states of allowing outsourcing especially in 
technical matters and mandate to raise resources through borrowings is a good practice 
that deserves emulation. So is the transfer of rights for extraction of minerals whilst 
keeping the revenues (Madhya Pradesh). 
  As in the case of the manner of transfer of funds, the ‘best practices’ need to be 
documented and other states encouraged (by arm twisting?!) to emulate. As things stand, 
by and large, the SFCs as an instrument of devolution of funds seem to have been a 
singular failure. Some good practices with regards to process and quantum of flow of 
funds are undoubtedly in evidence, but these are largely in states that have already been 
converted to the dharma of decentralization. The role of SFCs in converting the significant 
majority of other states s non-existent. Given the sharp contrast with which this presents to 
the practice of practically mandatory acceptance of Central Finance Commission a good 
deal of soul searching is called for. Perhaps the centripetal bias of our federation needs 
to be invoked to take concrete steps (including constitutional amendment) to force 
the issue of empowering properly constituted State Finance Commissions, who would 
in their turn become agents of real change.  
 
VI.3 Specific  States 
  The four states specifically commented upon in this sub-section fall in the 
category of states that have accepted and by and large released funds as per the 
recommendations of the SFCs. The first three states are also those with considerable 
pedigree in matters of PRIs and had early starts. Despite this and the apparent intent on 
the part of the states to push for decentralization (sometimes beyond the requirement as 
laid down by either the 73
rd CAA or indeed the SFC recommendations) in terms of fiscal-
financial decentralization (as captured by us) and ranking emanating there from, they 
have not done well. This clearly underlines the pre-eminence of the proposition that an 
important pre-requisite here is the Finances of the State government itself. The 
fourth one is the most populous state which is a member of the BIMARU states and is 
showing some initiative to deal with the issues of decentralization.  
VI.3.1 Kerala Inspired by and as a part of the peoples movement, and as recommended by the 
first administrative reforms committee, the state passed the Kerala Panchayat Bill (1958) 
and District Council Bill (1959) to get a head start over others. Kerala has devolved most 
to rural governments and redesigned its planning process by revision of the Panchayat 
Raj Act in 1999. The state – post 73
rd CAA – took a big bang approach to 
decentralization. The Kerala model is also renowned for the achievements such as high 
literacy, especially amongst women with a positive impact on local government. Kerala 
established fewer but larger GPs whereas Karnataka (also considered in this section) went 
precisely the in opposite direction. 
Kerala is the only State in which three State Finance Commissions have submitted 
their reports with practically every recommendation being adopted. Each SFC has been a 
path breaker. The First SFC succeeded in integrating seventeen small specific purpose 
grants into a broader general purpose grants and also in streamlining the determination 
and transfer of the share of State taxes, making it fully formula-based and totally non-
discretionary. The Second SFC moved away from sharing specific State taxes and 
suggested global sharing of State's Own Tax Revenue, fixing 3.5% as General Purpose 
Grant and 5.5% as Maintenance Grant. The Third SFC has moved on to a regime of fixed 
grants. It fixed the base year's grant equivalent to the recommendations of the Second 
SFC and suggested 10% annual increases for the five year period. While this has cost the 
Local Governments the possible gains due to buoyancy in tax revenue, it has improved 
predictability as the SFC has indicated Local Government-wise share for each year over 
the five year period under the three streams of General Purpose Fund, Maintenance Fund 
and Development Fund. 
The most revolutionary aspect of Kerala’s decentralization is the provision of 
substantial untied funds for local prioritization and local resource allocation to 
identified priority areas. It is significant to note that this was not recommended by 
any SFC but was a policy decision taken by the State Government at the beginning 
of the IXth FYP. 
While the State has been able to go beyond what is strictly essential (as per SFC 
reports) and has been able to consolidate CSS in some cases leading to welcome increase 
in the untied grants recently, there has unfortunately a drop in the statutory grants which 
is wholly unwelcome. Also, it has been noticed that restriction of actual flows to PRIs get 
aggravated every time there is a glitch in the state finances. Thus even when credited to 
their Treasury accounts, the panchayats are not able to use the funds because the fiancé 
department will not release them. The performance audit shows up some lacunae which 
have to mostly do with the outmoded accounting and record keeping. However all this 
should not detract from the many positive features in Kerela case such as transparency 
especially in beneficiary selection, RTI, social audit which need to be further encouraged, 
strengthened and emulated by other states. 
VI.3.2 Karnataka 
Establishment of ‘local fund’ in 1862 was the beginning by the state with regard 
to decentralization. In 1954, Local Boards Enquiry Committee recommended setting up 
opf the three tier structure in the state. In 1956 a new act was adopted to standardize the 
varying structure of governments in the state. In many ways, Karnataka was ahead of the 
decentralization reforms initiated in 1992 and may have influenced the thinking on empowerment of rural governments. It has also maintained its proactive stance on this 
matter over time (see, Geeta Sethi, 2004). 
The First State Finance Commission (recommending for the period from 1996-97 
to 2000-01) recommended the transfer of 36 percent of Non-loan Gross Own revenue 
Receipts of the State for transfer to PRIs and ULBs. This was to be shared between PRIs 
and ULBs in the ratio of 85% and 15% respectively. It was recommended that the 
horizontal sharing between ZPs, TPs and Gram Panchayats should be 40 %, 35% and 
25% respectively. Regarding horizontal sharing, it suggested the criteria and weigthage 
on which the share may be distributed. The Second Finance Commission recommended 
the transfer of 40 percent out of NLGORR of the State to PRIs (32% and ULBs 8%). 
While recommending an increase in the overall proportion of the NLGORR that should 
go to PRIs and ULBs put together from 36 percent to 40 percent. The IInd SFC gave 
ULBs a higher increase in the share of NLGORR as compared to PRIs, while making the 
inter-se share between them. It also changed the weightage marginally and added one 
criterion (SC/ST) and removed one (Road length). With respect to the 32 percent that it 
recommended should go to the PRIs, the SFC made the ‘pecking order’ recommendations 
regarding the further devolutions within the PRI to set up the order of charge.  
With respect to the devolution of statutory grants to Grama Panchayats, the FC 
recommended a pro-rata increase of the allocations at the rate of Rs. 25,000/- per year for 
each Grama Panchayat. The State has accepted the report of the First and Second 
State Finance Commissions. The State has always taken the stand that its devolution 
of funds to Panchayats has exceeded the proportion recommended by the Finance 
Commissions. This is indeed a fact, if the devolution of non-plan funds to Panchayats is 
reckoned. However, in practice, the horizontal formula for inter-se sharing of funds 
between Panchayats has not been followed leading to distortion between the transfer of 
funds and functions and hence expenditure. Due to lack of information, the per-capita 
transfers too are not fairly devolved across districts, even in case of targeted schemes. 
The grant size increase seems to have no relation to revenue effort which is ad-hoc and 
would lead to disincentives. This is one of among some of the lacunae in SFC report 
implementation (see Geeta Sethi, 2004). 
  Some of the other problem areas are worth noting here, despite having well 
formulated transfer rules (time and magnitude) there continues to be bunching at the end 
of the financial year and worse still when the state finances are perceived to be in trouble, 
PRIs are one of the early casualties. The other problem deals with the transferred staff 
who refuse to be accountable to PRI administration and owe allegiance and loyalty to the 
line departments. The dominance of line departments lead to the problem of proliferation 
of schemes and overlapping function which is a governance issue. In recent past the plan 
expenditure of the district sector is showing declining trend which is worrisome, however 
there are refreshing signs in the most recent times as may be seen from the table below 
(as reported by the State government. 
Details of plan allocations made to Panchayats( In Rs. Crs.) 
 
Year  Zilla Panchayat  Taluk Panchayat Gram 
Panchayat 
Total 
2004-05  798 482  316  1596 
percentage (50.0)  (30.2)  (19.8)  (100.0) 2005-06  1208 765  1588  3561 
percentage (33.9)  (21.5)  (44.6)  (100.0) 
2006-07  1253 976  2131  4360 
percentage (28.7)  (22.4)  (48.9)  (100.0) 
2007-08  2428 7790  1977  5784 
Percentage (47)  (15)  (38)  (100.0) 
No. of plan 
Schemes 
212 72 30  314 
Source: Government of Karnataka 
 
 
The cost of collection seems to be huge as compared to the collection in a sample 
of villages studied, and although as a proportion of property tax it is showing decrease, as 
a percent of total revenues it continues to rise, with the implication that property tax is 
very important as it should be and other sources are not being tapped. This is clearly 
unacceptable.  
VI.3.4 West Bengal 
  One of the states that has implemented decentralization more thoroughly and from 
long time is West Bengal. In the earliest avatar, it took the form of Union Boards through 
an Act in 1885 followed by the 1919 Bengal Village Self Government Act. Of course, in 
terms of financial parameters, it is not – as seen in the earlier section – a top state, the 
reasons in this case are more to do with political praxis than economics. The three tier 
system with elections and at the cost of bureaucracy exists for at least three decades and 
predates the 73
rd CAA. The local government allowed for mobilization of popular 
participation though biased in a party political manner against the entrenched power 
centers. The greater emphasis on political decentralization has meant the financial 
autonomy was rather limited. The extent of financial devolution was limited and own 
revenues accounted for less than 4% of local government budgets, with employment 
grants accounting for 60% and tied grants amounting to 25% there was very little 
expenditure autonomy possible. Apart from responsiveness and accountability, the 
evidence of seat reservation for women in the chair positions shows a statistically 
significant shift to road maintenance and drinking water supply projects. The 
absence of formula based allocations indicated that greater poverty, illiteracy and 
proportion of lower caste residents were negatively correlated to the resource flow into 
the village (see, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2007). This limitation seems to be reducing in 
the recent past and more and more delegation of responsibilities with financial tones are 
being delegated. Thus there appears to be a movement away from deconcentration to 
delegation, with resultant lessening of the sway of the line departments. Greater 
participatory roel for the ultimate agents also has resulted in better targeting of 
beneficiaries under different schemes, although the partisan political bias is also evident. 
The first State Finance Commission was constituted under Notification No. 1023-
FB dated May 30, 1994. The Commission submitted its report on November 27, 1995 
which covered the period 1996-2001 West Bengal is one of the few States where all the 
recommendations of the State Finance Commission have been accepted. Explanatory 
Memorandum as to the action taken on the recommendations was laid to the State 
Assembly on July 22, 1996.            The second SFC was constituted under Notification No. 1770-FB dated July 14, 
2000. The Commission submitted its report on February 6, 2002 which covered the 
period 2001-06. Explanatory Memorandum as to the action taken on the 
recommendations was laid to the State Assembly on July 15, 2005 and the State 
Government accepted most of the recommendations.  
                      The  Third  State  Finance  Commission  has  been  constituted  under 
Notification No. 4000-FB dated February 22, 2006. The Commission will submit its 
report to the State Govt. by March, 2008. While there are not many innovative features to 
be seen in the transfer design or implementation in this case as compared to Kerala and 
Karnataka the table given below regarding the flows to the PRIs, as reported by the State 
give scope for much hope. 
 
Transfer of Fund to the PANCHAYATS During 10
th Five Year plan period 




























2002-03  147.84 94.38  144.59  77.32 464.13  367.08  831.21 
2003-04 183.93  161.75  142.03  72.07  559.78  403.07  962.85 
2004-05  193.39 200.61  161.62  124.97 680.59  530.79  1,211.38
2005-06  192.43  425.23  273.77 174.79 1,066.22  948.99  2,015.21
2006-07 210.79  317.71  302.90  402.55  1233.95  789.86  2023.81 
 
The share in percent terms as reflected in the above table seem to be reasonable 
and stable.  
Flow of Fund to Different Tiers of PRIs From State budget of PRDD 
(Rs. in crore) 
Tier  2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Zilla  Parishads  183.30 228.48 240.61 345.09 290.02 
Panchayat  Samitis  65.52 44.50 79.01  154.82  156.33 
Gram  Panchayats 215.31 286.80 360.97 566.31 787.60 
TOTAL  464.13 559.78 680.59  1066.22  1233.95 
Here too the share of funds in percent terms to the three tiers to be stabilizing in 
the right direction. However the magnitudes seem to be on the lower side and hence 
inadequate. The main purpose of the left front to create a strong political base appears to 
be served.  
VI.3.5 Uttar Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh represents the most populous state (16% of the Country) in this 
massive experiment in democracy. Although it is on of the BIMARU states, the reason for including a brief section here is to acknowledge that some initiatives have been taken 
and in particular an analytical study with a rigorous methodology for sample selection 
was conducted to gauge awareness and estimated potential revenue sources that could be 
tapped.  
The relevant findings (we will concentrate only on financial matters) are 
recounted in what follows. Awareness of Gram Sabha members about development 
programs is interesting. The most popular or the development programmes implemented 
in large number of villages about which more than 90% of Gram Sabha members were 
aware were: 
I.  Indira Awas Yojna 
II.  Old Age Pension 
III.  Widow Pension 
IV.  Assistance to Handicapped and Orphans 
V.  Rural Drinking Water Supply Schemes 
Whereas the sick programs according to the responses of the Gram Sabha 
members, about which on an average only 40% members were aware of: 
I.  SGSY 
II.  REGP 
III.  PMGSY 
IV.  Annapurna 
V.  NFBS 
VI.  NMBS 
VII.  Rural Sanitation (better than above) 
VIII.  Loan to SC/ST/OBC and Minorities 
The following resources were perceived from which the Panchayats could raise their own 
revenue to carry out their functions: 
1.  Grazing land 
2.  Agriculture land 
3.  Orchard  
4.  Tree Plantation 
5.  Ponds 
6.  River Beds 
7.  River Ghats 
8.  Shops 
9.  Community Hall 
10. Weekly Markets 
11.  Mela Place 
Out of the perceived 4 resources of income (Grazing land, Agricultural land, 
Orchards and Ponds), only grazing land (tragedy of commons) and Ponds were available 
in all the Gram Panchayats in sufficient acreage and quantity. In other cases, either 
because the sources were only in few places or because of perceived implementation 
difficulties (danda raj), or not knowing how, the resources were not exploited. But the 
Gram Panchayts were not raising any appreciable income from even the first four 
sources.  Clearly in other sources, revenue extraction was not happening and a skewed 
gain by some by way of rent-seeking behavior. On the basis of sample data the overall value of all available internal resources in 
U.P. comes to Rs. 445,647,967,148 (Rs 44,564 Crores) and the total value of encroached 
resources was Rs.18,216 crore. But there was not much hue and cry by the Panchayat and 
Gram Sabha members against encroachment. As far as who will help in development 
there continued to be heavy dependence on government, particularly central government, 
it was quite encouraging to find that as high as 32% felt that the Panchayat itself should 
generate funds for its development. There was a felt need to have greater power in 
determination of policy. For greater details see HARAYALI (2007) 
  While the states covered above (especially the first three) represent best practises 
in the conceptualization (design of transfers) as well as passage of de jure enablement 
through acts, and accomplishment of political devolution, when it comes to – the very 
crucial – matter of actual finances, the implementation over time leaves much scope for 
improvement. Of course even more so is the reliable data and records (including the 
recording mechanisms in place).  
VII.   Epilogue: Pons Asinorum  
Thus as is amply clear, there are quite a few stumbling blocks in the way of 
successful implementation of the decentralization program. Clearly, passage of Acts in 
the parliament cannot do the job. The federal political structure that we have in India 
some how seems to lead to attempt at dragging their feet on part of the states. In this 
section we briefly comment on only three of such reasons (each of which is multi-
dimensional) and rectification will take some doing. To be sure, much has been 
happening in fits and starts on all the counts that we discus here. To repeat, the issues 
here are not of conceptual clarity but rather that of taking the next essential step of big 
ticket/push action. 
VII.1 Data   
  We don’t need to refer to Voltaire’s dictum of ‘text before criticism to recognize 
the paramount importance of availability of up-to-date data on finances of the PRIs, if an 
evaluation exercise is to be meaningfully conducted. This alone will ensure an exercise 
that will lead to rigorous conclusions as against opinions. Without it the exercise is in 
danger of becoming either of significance from the view point of contemporary history 
alone or one which is merely speculative in nature. Many researchers including us (see 
Pethe and Lalvani) have commented – almost ad-nauseum – on the data problems in 
similar arenas. The problem is even more acute when one considers the PRIs. There 
cannot be greater situational tragedy than to have to evaluate finances where consistent 
available data at the state levels is available with am almost five years lag. And even then 
it is not tier level, forget about the level of expenditure-functional classification. It is true 
that such data must be available somewhere in bits and pieces (and occasional evidence is 
seen) but non-coordination between different departments and levels precludes the 
possibility of any automatic compilation in a user-friendly manner. Also one more 
problem has to do with the fact that there is no uniformity (across states) in the heads 
under which the data, when available, are recorded. None of this in this day and age 
(especially of the much touted IT enablement) should be acceptable in India. A concerted 
effort is thus called for. Of course the work will have to begin at the source level where 
data is first recorded. A uniform format for compilation will have to be instituted across 
states and PRIs. Of course this takes us further back into the entire issue of accounting 
procedures and capacities. There is something to be said for borrowing the ‘good practice’ of creating manual and corresponding training modules, by the UDD of the GoI. 
However, this must not be allowed to hold us back. The protocols must be put in place 
for data to be compiled and sent upward to the MoPR through a determined path (of not 
too many agencies) at a regular interval. Perhaps the Bureaus/ Directorates of Economics 
and Statistics at the State government level could be directed to act as the responsible 
nodal agency. MoPr should do the enabling spade work and immediately set the process 
in motion for data compilation on all the financial data and indeed of making it available 
on the public domain. There is the quality aspect as well as data on good practices that 
are equally important. But we believe that those things will have to wait (not for too long, 
one hopes!) for the moment. 
VII.2  Processes and Actual Devolution of Resources 
  When all is said and done, the main issue has to do with the actual devolution of 
finances. With the best of allocations at Central as well at the State levels and even with 
giving additional revenue handles to the PRIs, not to mention the scrupulously worked 
out schemas for devolution by the SFCs, ‘the best laid plans will come to a naught’, if 
these are not backed by actual finances in the hands of the ultimate agents. There is a 
marked divergence between the allocation/outlays and ‘actuals’. This is true whether one 
is talking about the funds under CSS or the SFC transfers (accepted by the state 
government). This is also reflected in proliferation of schemes (at the State as well as the 
Central level) and on each count the absorption is far from satisfactory. There has been a 
consequent call for consolidation of schemes that is being put into practice, but much 
remains to be done. The ultimate brunt is borne by the vulnerable poor in the rural areas. 
This has not only adverse implications for the agents but also for the principal in terms of 
credibility. There are some best practices here being demonstrated by few states that need 
to be learnt from. The absorptive capacity and involved processes at all levels of 
governmental functioning entail horrendous waste of time. The irony is that each level of 
government seems to demean the level of capacity at the lower level with little 
introspection on the self. The use of this euphemism as an excuse for lack or delay in 
transfer has gone on too long and would be as funny a la ‘Yes Minister’, except that it is 
really hurting. Enough number of reform commissions have mulled over the issues and 
listed out the simplification, efficiency and transparency mechanisms and the time to act 
on these is yesterday! 
Finally, we would strongly urge two things, one, the things to be done here should 
not be done sequentially (there would be an argument and urge to do so in the name of 
convenience and propriety) for, it would only lead to waste of further time. And two, no 
pilot studies need to undertaken but the whole scheme should be undertaken in a mission 
mode, here and now in a big bang, here and now, fashion!  
VIII.  Quo Vadis: The Way Forward 
  We need to take in all the lessons and experiences accumulated thus far and 
reflect  but more importantly start afresh in a big ticket mode. As we have argued earlier, 
the politico-economic conjuncture is opportune. Thus, apart from the data (financial and 
of best practices as well as protocols with IT enabled ERP solutions) and accounting as 
well as process matters – which are of a primary importance – that we have already 
commented upon, we would suggest a few things. 
  In a revivalist Keynesian fashion we would like to suggest that we need to put 
financial resources (as also functionaries) with the PRIs. This alone will lend substance to all the design of transfers and decentralization as well as governance efforts in general. 
As Thomas Issacs, the architect of People’s Campaign in Kerala, has noted (see, 
Shubham Chaudhary, 2007) the preconditions for decentralization are to be created in the 
decentralization process itself. As we have noted, let us not allow the ‘lack of capacity’ 
argument to detract us even as we continue our efforts on that front. This alone will allow 
PRIs the facility of learning by doing. After all when ever in history was infrastructure 
provided in anticipation?! It always happens when a threshold demand is signaled. The 
fear of decentralization of corruption notwithstanding, we would still strongly hold this 
view. After all the leakages are of such magnitude that (tongue firmly in cheek) we would 
venture to hazard that welfare will be better served with more uniformly distributed, 
stable term structure of corruption than a monopolized concentrated entitlement at high 
places. The Central Finance Commissions must be proactive and make devolutions on 
account of non-plan expenditure so that we move away from the ethos of ribbon cutting 
activity. In this context – and at a more general level – there needs to be review of the 
artificial plan/non-plan and even revenue/capital expenditures. The fact that Vijay Kelkar 
(2004) who heads the 13
th FC has views along similar lines gives us reason for hope 
  Call the bluff that the PRIs universally have a poor fiscal base and relentlessly 
push – in an incentive compatible mode – for greater effort and search of additional 
handles. Exploit the revenue base that exists (individually and jointly by some PRIs) and 
use modified pooled funding approach create an access to the capital markets and more 
simply, loan exposure. To borrow from Wilde, if some of us dare to look up to the stars, 
it should be encouraged. Don’t be afraid to be non-homothetic in approach and breaking 
through the rural-urban divide, treating the whole space as a continuum and forging 
synergies across the local bodies. Here the onus of capacity building and learning firmly 
lies – to a greater extent – with the financial institutions who will have to create a new 
risk matrix and innovate through linking of ‘grain loan facility’ in order to provide food 
security and reducing the risk profile. This will also require us to face the stiff trade off 
between equity and efficiency. 
  Finally consolidate schemes. Let go of those that are not functioning and thus cut 
losses. Prioritize and in the first instance concentrate on those dealing with water, 
education and roads. We should thus move forward decisively creating an Enabling 
Mechanism for Panchayats to Operate  Water,  Education and Road  Schemes: it 
EMPOWERS! 
IX. Conclusion  
  The emerging agenda implied in all that we have written is of mammoth 
proportions and not for the faint hearted. It is to the undoubted credit of the ‘toddler of a 
mere four years’ MoPR that it has plunged into action right away and drawn up action 
plans in a systematic way. The credit for the fact that there has been some success shown 
on the front of the State governments taking action on various actions suggested 
(although at a slow pace) is a singular achievement of the dynamism shown by MoPR 
and its leadership. The PM has directly intervened to afford centrality to MoPR and its 
charge (in a sense) the PRIs, in every possible including the flagship programs. This was 
to be especially true where the CSS hit the ground and impact the local public goods. The 
activity mapping is done in almost all the states and seven are on record to have provided 
a budget window in their budgets. Consultants are in place to check the actual flow of 
funds. A whole list of a host of activities has been drawn up which is impressive as it is well thought out, that this is being done by the NDC subcommittee lends it credibility 
(see GoI, 2008). However, all these functions are possible only if adequate funding is 
provided. After all we don’t need Bahl (1999) to tell us that finance must follow function. 
On this aspect unfortunately there is silence! 
  The issue is deeper, as has been noted (see Konrad Adenauer (1998)) the PRIs 
were to be vibrant institutions in the democratic set up on the country and yet the 
requisite recognition has not been granted in the corridors of power. The recent Central 
Finance Commissions have been doing their bit – especially the 12 CFC – to situate PRIs 
within the structure of Indian Federal Public Finance, and one hopes that the tradition is 
strengthened further (see Pethe, 2008) so that they can be more effective.  
  Thus, the Polity, Economy and Administration are entwined in a triangular set-up 
that resembles not a light romantic comedy but rather a rough ménage a trios and it is 
essential that they find a way through to EMPOWER, with adequate financial strength, 
for ensuring smooth attainment of the Development goals of the Indian society. This 
then, is how in the simple story of poor PRIs and what to do about it thickens and for all 
the grand designs in other related spheres and aspects, unless we are ready to put money 
where our mouth is, the goal of transforming India into a ‘developed’ super power will 
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PRI Own Revenue (Per Capita) 
 
  93-94 94-95 95-96  96-97  97-98 Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra  Pradesh  16.54 18.34  20.56  25.03 26.17 21.33 24.12 25.24 27.72 29.03 30.45 27.31
Assam    1.56  1.57  1.58  1.59  1.60 1.58 3.22 3.24 3.24 3.20 3.22 3.23
Goa  22.94 35.98  41.79  48.60 53.03 40.47 96.06 95.11 102.11 110.29 116.77 104.07
Gujarat  12.02 11.93  12.46  13.79 13.77 12.80 26.06 26.62 24.74 22.55 21.69 24.33
Haryana  29.03 30.97  29.26  28.65 36.10 30.80 42.42 42.03 49.47 50.77 51.52 47.24
Karnataka  0.80 0.95  1.25  1.37 1.25 1.13 15.15 16.59 19.18 14.99 16.81 16.55
Kerala  1.83 2.05  3.65  4.69 4.80 3.40 71.72 100.24 91.88 81.93 94.37 88.03
Madhya  Pradesh  3.21 4.87  5.53  5.77 5.82 5.04 22.22 22.73 26.39 32.07 38.85 28.45
Maharashtra  2.09 3.27  3.73  3.85 3.89 3.37 44.83 52.97 60.03 68.73 83.01 61.91Orissa  2.49 2.81  2.48  2.43 2.36 2.51 3.07 2.84 2.93 2.81 1.74 2.68
Punjab  26.67 30.44  33.10  31.09 34.81 31.22 42.15 52.70 50.33 40.40 60.59 49.24
Rajasthan  6.76 7.22  7.36  8.83 8.37 7.71 8.55 9.71 9.37 8.56 8.57 8.95
Tamil  Nadu  6.22 6.45  8.27  7.41 8.55 7.38 12.92 14.56 18.10 17.80 18.44 16.37
Uttar  Pradesh  3.24 3.36  3.17  3.31 3.86 3.39 3.79 4.30 4.64 4.49 4.73 4.39
West  Bengal  2.70 2.83  2.86  2.84 3.66 2.98 5.36 5.40 5.81 5.80 5.33 5.54













PRI Grants (Per Capita) 
 
  93-94 94-95 95-96  96-97  97-98 Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra Pradesh  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  452.38 496.55 651.40  707.50 752.98 612.16
Assam    N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Goa  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  33.43 40.05 70.35 194.30 280.77 123.78
Gujarat  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  929.10 994.27 1276.30  862.66 832.50 978.97
Haryana  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  31.62 100.11 71.24 121.60 101.56 85.23
Karnataka  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kerala  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  253.46 216.57 218.64  202.86 230.56 224.42
Madhya Pradesh  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.42 0.31
Maharashtra  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  491.05 954.85 646.10  726.90 828.54 729.49
Orissa  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  28.57 50.28 13.56 19.77 31.62 28.76
Punjab  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  5.44 19.83 19.46 12.43 18.27 15.09
Rajasthan  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  238.35 271.28 241.33  248.72 239.44 247.83
Tamil Nadu  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uttar Pradesh  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  1.26 0.01 0.09 0.03 4.57 1.19
West Bengal  N.A. N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  25.48 46.49 103.59 71.30 24.88 54.35










Table A.3  
 
 
PRI Total Revenue (Per Capita) 
 
  93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99     1999-00     2000-01     2001-02     2002-03    Average
Andhra Pradesh  291.65 312.08 318.75  392.56  477.04  358.42  503.13 587.45 708.04 767.25 816.09 676.39
Assam    1.77 1.78 1.80  1.81  7.18  2.87  3.22 3.24 3.24 3.20 3.22 3.23
Goa  89.66 107.93 105.53  92.41  141.52  107.41  134.65 140.51 179.13 308.43 411.82 234.91
Gujarat  443.76 529.81 590.54  806.95  761.80  626.57  1077.52 1165.35 1582.74 1070.12 1025.37 1184.22
Haryana  13.45 14.57 16.94  21.07  23.97  18.00  94.10 207.47 150.60 232.59 247.46 186.44
Karnataka  676.12 751.27 843.59  969.02 1111.03  870.21  989.16 1268.79 1354.37 1252.23 1216.46 1216.20
Kerala  49.60 61.78 89.01 219.36 381.01  160.15  399.67 400.39 348.64 355.20 401.12 381.01
Madhya Pradesh  58.27 52.18 84.55 123.91 317.31  127.25  84.12 84.45 94.72 126.34 106.35 99.20
Maharashtra  61.22 54.82 88.82 130.17 333.36  133.68  559.93 1029.57 727.79 823.42 942.51 816.65
Orissa  127.37 139.15 181.47  209.19  215.52  174.54  56.78 71.66 37.55 43.40 59.23 53.73
Punjab  100.76 111.57 117.61  91.40  87.52  101.77  63.55 88.29 85.38 68.36 109.53 83.02
Rajasthan  242.54 306.65 359.99  399.07  413.65  344.38  408.67 445.36 415.92 416.26 412.08 419.66
Tamil Nadu  118.92 85.05 87.23 107.22 105.99  100.88  161.30 150.98 205.70 110.75 250.99 175.94
Uttar Pradesh  54.59 52.81 60.84  52.94  73.15  58.86  32.99 40.55 48.35 48.59 46.63 43.42
West Bengal  84.02 94.78  105.22  97.84  91.24  94.62  31.75 52.11 110.45 79.45 30.21 60.80















PRI Total Expenditure (Per Capita) 
 
93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98  Average 
 1998-
99     1999-00     2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average
Andhra Pradesh  290.17 316.53 324.77 391.58  475.52 359.71 613.05 696.59 803.05 857.81 910.30 776.16
Assam    17.32 19.21 19.38 20.84  18.80 19.11 3.23 3.26 3.26 3.23 3.26 3.25
Goa  49.04 56.24 64.96 71.10 102.16 68.70 134.65 140.51 179.13 308.43 411.82 234.91
Gujarat  508.09 535.03 628.95 690.74  774.18 627.40 984.77 1066.52 1337.96 1109.33  796.21 1058.96
Haryana  77.23 83.70 93.37 73.73 108.97 87.40 93.54 207.47 150.60 232.59 247.47 186.33
Karnataka  582.56 552.35 705.76 895.70  991.32 745.54 906.79 1210.61 1298.24 1203.25 1157.91 1155.36
Kerala  52.42 63.36  116.65  216.12 277.37 145.18 759.77 712.14 635.93 580.20 744.93 686.59
Madhya Pradesh  59.36 54.04 84.09  123.38 314.03 126.98 83.85 84.18 93.89  126.05  105.93 98.78
Maharashtra  62.36 56.77 88.35  129.62 329.91 133.40 568.95 663.62 700.09 750.25 831.99 702.98Orissa  127.37 139.15 181.47 209.19  215.52 174.54 56.78 71.66 37.55 43.40 57.50 53.38
Punjab  104.22 106.29 123.41 104.63  103.10 108.33 63.55 88.29 85.38 68.36  109.53 83.02
Rajasthan  242.40 307.82 357.92 400.82  418.32 345.46 359.77 419.40 397.68 375.84 395.04 389.55
Tamil Nadu  68.85 68.17 73.50 99.46 123.18 86.63 88.71 132.80 182.02 147.28 148.82 139.93
Uttar Pradesh  54.15 52.62 60.87 56.57  75.13 59.87 32.71 46.88 48.79 32.84 44.50 41.14
West Bengal  82.10 104.14 111.39  99.66  103.79 100.21 31.75 52.11  110.45 79.45 30.21 60.80












GSDP from Primary Sector at Current Prices - GSDPP 
(Per Capita) 
 
93-94  94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 Average   1998-99    1999-00     2000-01    2001-02    2002-03   Av
ra  Pradesh  4132.16 4771.90 5427.74 6062.66 5718.99 5222.69  7407.73 7549.36 8522.19 8716.83 8473.40 81
m    3461.17  4025.82  4270.67  4258.71  4809.39  4165.15  5310.02 6171.91 5865.76 6001.82 6472.70 59
7126.23 8089.85 8248.87 8583.80  10666.91 8543.13  11337.04 11486.35 14601.70 15541.30 14345.34 134
at  4497.27 6483.41 5780.12 7886.52 7765.23 6482.51  8807.26 6800.29 6223.50 7294.21 7742.80 73
ana 7356.09  8383.38  8393.72  10196.65  10088.71  8883.71  11164.33 11666.66 12066.35 11528.67 11681.61 116
ataka  4666.90 5111.01 5741.78 6502.56 6545.05 5713.46  7705.49 8215.03 8692.43 7408.88 7239.87 78
a  3652.97 4391.70 5254.77 5806.41 5762.41 4973.65  5985.96 6561.70 6224.45 5805.78 6395.90 61
hya  Pradesh  1534.68 1907.75 2175.63 2360.80 2584.02 2112.58  2896.80 3494.72 4276.71 6631.95 5749.21 46
rashtra  4587.81 5086.39 5614.82 7435.76 6389.75 5822.90  6734.12  7561.86 12104.17 12804.75 14190.62 106
a  2952.50 3414.09 4334.26 3919.16 4969.57 3917.91  5176.39 5017.82 4677.82 5191.73 5304.55 50
b  9490.40 10341.04 11039.26 12745.21 13245.10 11372.20  14340.73 15965.77 16869.03 17504.71 16782.15 162
than  3424.26 4353.14 4737.08 6132.86 6321.57 4993.78  7058.53 6678.13 6235.35 5180.53 6142.39 62
l  Nadu  3768.65 4159.88 4033.21 4510.00 5315.41 4357.43  5908.00 5408.29 7540.05 6879.16 5722.21 62
Pradesh  2790.13 3136.45 3370.70 4021.22 4081.59 3480.02  4570.24 4925.88 4945.89 4852.54 5167.90 48
Bengal  3558.69 4201.34 4835.53 5430.29 6601.56 4925.48  7486.21 7607.15 7727.20 8069.64 7849.89 77












GSDP from Primary Sector at Constant 1993-94 Prices - GSDPPR 
(Per Capita) 
 
93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 Average   1998-  1999-00     2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Aver
dhra  Pradesh  4132.16 4026.46 4201.67 4417.93 3696.47 4094.94  4501.05 4413.09 4981.01 4949.56 4493.42 4667
am      3461.17 3443.27 3453.11 3383.11 3514.12 3450.95  3348.99 3311.57 3179.50 3301.48 3276.89 3283
7126.23 7211.94 6985.19 6938.01 7509.06 7154.09  7367.93 6935.49 6662.93 7858.06 8122.63 7389
arat  4497.27 6043.50 5316.86 6839.18 6227.16 5784.80  6478.00 4726.91 4136.29 5106.74 4482.30 4986
yana  7356.09 7770.38 7311.96 8004.42 7285.09 7545.59  7437.52 7677.08 7667.46 7279.71 7130.19 743
nataka  4666.90 4593.61 4636.91 4801.35 4632.89 4666.33  5071.59 5467.06 6062.56 5185.08 4751.24 5307
ala  3652.97 3950.91 3867.36 3911.37 3670.57 3810.63  3721.16 3770.08 3055.15 3086.97 3092.64 3345
dhya  Pradesh  3134.43 3030.39 3078.83 3206.77 3219.46 3133.98  3285.70 3428.31 2774.03 4050.63 3371.20 338
harashtra  4587.81 4468.04 4623.63 5276.12 4533.56 4697.83  4735.49 5036.59 4715.67 4874.62 4739.15 4820
sa  2952.50 2935.19 3012.13 2709.20 3176.06 2957.02  3126.38 2919.03 2771.98 3110.19 2783.16 2942
jab  9490.40  9560.54  9444.71  9980.66  9410.70  9577.40 9575.48 10142.27 10339.22 10408.52  9916.80 1007
asthan  3424.26 4167.94 4026.69 4743.97 4909.86 4254.54  4874.46 4255.51 3693.04 4176.52 2888.74 3977
mil  Nadu  3768.65 4139.66 3573.80 3498.77 3749.04 3745.98  4034.57 3793.57 5127.87 4628.83 3611.27 4239
ar  Pradesh  2790.13 2839.48 2857.91 3087.09 2901.12 2895.15  2959.91 3182.49 3088.45 3033.54 3078.77 306
st  Bengal  3558.69 3787.30 3825.01 3993.33 4260.58 3884.98  4106.74 4163.64 4197.80 4481.61 4243.80 423














PRI own Revenue/State Own Revenue (RD1) 
 
  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra Pradesh  3  1  1  1  1  1  5 6 5 5 6 5 
Assam    13  12  14  14  14  14  13 14 14 14 14 14 
Goa 6  4  5  4  6  5  8 8 9  12  10  8 
Gujarat 4  5  4  6  5  4  7 7 8 7 7 7 
Haryana 2  3  3  3  3  3  6 5 4 4 4 4 
Karnataka 15  15  15  15  15  15  9 9 7  10  8 9 
Kerala 12  14  12  11  11  12  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Madhya Pradesh  9  7  7  7  7  7  2 2 2 2 2 2 
Maharashtra 14  13  13  13  13  13  4 3 3 3 3 3 Orissa 11  10  11  12  12  11  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Punjab 1  2  2  2  2  2  3 4 6 6 5 6 
Rajasthan 5  6  6  5  4  6  10 10 10  8  9  10 
Tamil Nadu  8  9  8  9  9  8  14 12 13 13 12 13 
Uttar Pradesh  7  8  9  8  8  9  12 13 12  9  11 12 














PRI own Revenue/State Own Revenue + PRI Own Revenue (RD2) 
 
  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra Pradesh  3  1  1  1  1  1  5 6 5 5 6 5 
Assam    13  12  14  14  14  14  13 14 14 14 14 14 
Goa 6  4  5  4  6  5  8 8 9  12  10  8 
Gujarat 4  5  4  6  5  4  7 7 8 7 7 7 
Haryana 2  3  3  3  3  3  6 5 4 4 4 4 
Karnataka 15  15  15  15  15  15  9 9 7  10  8 9 
Kerala 12  14  12  11  11  12  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Madhya Pradesh  9  7  7  7  7  7  2 2 2 2 2 2 
Maharashtra 14  13  13  13  13  13  4 3 3 3 3 3 
Orissa 11  10  11  12  12  11  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Punjab 1  2  2  2  2  2  3 4 6 6 5 6 
Rajasthan 5  6  6  5  4  6  10 10 10  8  9  10 
Tamil Nadu  8  9  8  9  9  8  14 12 13 13 12 13 
Uttar Pradesh  7  8  9  8  8  9  12 13 12  9  11 12 













Dependency Ratio (DR) 
 
  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra Pradesh  7  8  7  6  6  6  12 12 12 12 11 12 
Assam    5  6  5  4  4  5  111  11 1 
Goa 1  1  1  1  1  1  223  34 3 
Gujarat 13  13  13  13  11  13  13 13 14 14 13 13 
Haryana 2  2  2  2  3  2  454  55 5 
Karnataka 15  15  15  15  15  15  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Kerala 9  10  10  12  12  11  966  67 6 
Madhya Pradesh  8  5  6  8  10  8  545  43 4 
Maharashtra 10  9  9  9  13  9  10 10 9 9 10 10 
Orissa 14  14  14  14  14  14  11 11 10 11 12 11 
Punjab 3  3  3  3  2  3  332  22 2 
Rajasthan 12  12  12  11  9  12  14 14 13 13 14 14 
Tamil Nadu  4  4  4  5  5  4  777  88 7 
Uttar Pradesh  6  7  8  7  7  7  898  79 9 















Change in Dependency Ratio (DDR) 
 
  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra Pradesh  -  7  2  7  11 5  -  7 10 7 7 8 
Assam    -  15 5  11  2 6  -  89  1 09 10 
Goa  -  1 3  2  15 2  -  12 15 15 15 15 
Gujarat  -  10 8  8  7 7  -  5 11 5 4 5 
Haryana  -  14 15  1  14 15  -  15 1 14 10 14 
Karnataka  -  9 4  9  4 4  -  67  96 7 
Kerala  -  11 6  12  8 11  -  1 5 11 11 2 
Madhya Pradesh  -  2 14 14  13 14  -  23  1 31 1 
Maharashtra  -  4 12 13  12 13  -  34  43 3 
Orissa  -  8 10 10  5 10  -  9 2 12 13 12 
Punjab  -  3 13  3  1 1  -  14 12 6 14 13 
Rajasthan  -  12 9  6  6 8  -  48  88 6 Tamil Nadu  -  5 1 15  9 12  -  11 13 2 5 11 
Uttar Pradesh  -  6 11  4  10 9  -  10 6 1 12 9 















Govt Size (GS1) 
 
  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra  Pradesh  4 4  4  4 4 4  443  33 3 
Assam    15  15  15  15  15 15  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Goa  12 11  12  12 12 12  9 11 11 8 8 9 
Gujarat  2 2  2  2 3 2  211  22 1 
Haryana  14 14  14  14 14 14  11 9 10 7 9 10 
Karnataka  1 1  1  1 1 1  122  11 2 
Kerala 10  10  10  7  5 7  566  66 6 
Madhya  Pradesh  6 6  6  6 2 5  788  9 1 0 8 
Maharashtra 11  13  11  10  7 9  335  55 4 
Orissa  5 5  5  5 8 6  10 10 13 13 11 11 
Punjab  13 12  13  13 13 13  13 14 14 14 13 14 
Rajasthan  3 3  3  3 6 3  654  44 5 
Tamil  Nadu  7 8  8  8 9 8  8 7 7 10 7 7 
Uttar Pradesh  9  9  9  11  10 11  12 12 12 11 12 12 














Govt Size (GS2) 
 
  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97  97-98  Average   1998-99    1999-00    2000-01     2001-02    2002-03   Average 
Andhra Pradesh  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 4 5 4 3 4 
Assam    15  15  15  15  15  15  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Goa 14  14  14  12  13  14  11 11  9  9  7  9 
Gujarat 2  2  2  2  3  2  1 1 3 2 4 1 
Haryana 13  13  13  14  12  12  9 10  11 8  9 10 
Karnataka 1  1  1  1  1  1  2 2 2 1 1 2 
Kerala 10  10  8  7  7  7  3 3 1 3 2 3 
Madhya Pradesh  6  6  6  6  2  5  8 8 7  10  10  7 
Maharashtra 11  11  11  10  6  8  5 6 4 6 6 5 
Orissa 5  5  5  5  8  6  10 13 10 12 11 11 
Punjab 12  12  12  13  14  13  14 14 13 14 13 14 
Rajasthan 3  3  3  3  5  3  6 5 6 5 5 6 
Tamil Nadu  9  9  9  8  9  10  7 7 8 7 8 8 
Uttar Pradesh  8  8  10  11  10  11  12 12 12 13 12 12 
West Bengal  7  7  7  9  11  9  13 9 14  11  14  13 
 
 